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I. STATUS
A.

NON-MARITAL UNIONS

LTHOUGH academic sources continue to provide ample discussion of unisexual unions, the quantum of litigation they produce
is evidently small.' The Internal Revenue Service has concluded
that though a same-sex domestic partner is not interpreted as a spouse for
1. Several symposia addressed such matters. See, e.g., Forum, Sexual Morality and
the Possibility of Same Sex Marriage: The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual
Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS, 97 (1997);
Symposium, InterjurisdictionalMarriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1998);
Symposium, Law and Politicsof Marriage,Loving v. Virginia After 30 Years: Constitutional
Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and the Politics of Marriage, 47 CATH. U.L. REV. 1231
(1998); Symposium, Queer Matters: Emerging Issues in Sexual OrientationLaw, 8 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 165 (1998); Symposium, ConstructingFamily, Constructing Change: Shifting
Legal Perspectives on Same-Sex Relationships, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 245
(1998); and Symposium, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty
Years, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998). Individual essays also examined the subject. See,
e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claimsfor Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat
from Marriageby Redefining Marriage,39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735 (1998); Jennifer Wriggins,
Maine's "Act to Protect Traditional Marriageand Prohibit Same-Sex Marriage": Questions
of Constitutionality under State and FederalLaw, 50 ME. L. REV. 345 (1998); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage,Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998);
Mark Strasser, ConstitutionalLimitations and Baehr Possibilities: On Retroactive Legislation, Reasonable Expectations, and Manifest Injustice, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 271 (1998); Mark
Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles' Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339 (1998).
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most tax purposes, such a domestic partner may be a dependent for the
2
purposes of tax treatment of health benefits.
A heterosexual non-marital union, however, produced an appellate discussion in Bexar County. In O'FarrillAvila v. Gonzdlez 3 a female cohabitant brought an action against her former male cohabitant for breach of
an alleged contract concerning the purchase of a home and a monthly
payment for her remaining in the city and staying at home with their
daughter. Unlike the dispute in Zaremba v. Cliburn,4 which turned on
the complainant's failure to produce written evidence of the promises
sought to be enforced in relation to a unisexual relationship, a written
5
agreement signed by both parties was before the court in this instance.
The whole court agreed that the written contract between the parties and
the seller of realty was sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of a
signed writing to support the plaintiff's evidence of a contract to repay
the plaintiff's payment of $60,000 toward the purchase of a house (in the
6
name of a corporation) in which the plaintiff had lived with the child.
Two members of the court agreed that a written agreement between the
parties also sufficiently supported the enforcement of the plaintiff's allegations of a further contract that the plaintiff would care for the child
during its formative years (until settled in school) at the rate of $5000 a
month. The terms of the written agreement entered into in Mexico City,
presumably in Spanish, are not quoted but are summarized by the majority of the court as "a bare promise to make monthly payments" to the
plaintiff without "mention of duration of these payments or of any return
promise made by [the plaintiff]." ' 7 The dissenting judge said that "[o]n
the state of this record, I do not believe it is remotely possible to 'understand what the promisor undertook.' 8 The majority of the court, however, relied on the doctrine of past-performance, as evidenced by the
testimony of the plaintiff, to support a finding of a contract of reasonable
duration for staying with and caring for the child. 9 The majority also supported the trial judge's award of attorney's fees of $25,000 (twelve and a
half percent of the monetary award for breach of the two contracts) and
allowed interest thereon from the date on which the appeal was
perfected. 10

2. See 1 Ltr. Rul. 98-500011 (Dec. 14 1998).
3. 974 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
4. 949 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet.). For further discussion see
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 51
SMU L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1998).
5. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a), (b)(3) (Vernon 1987).

6. See O'Farrill Avila, 974 S.W.2d at 242.
7. Id. at 242.
8. Id. at 250, Duncan, J., dissenting, citing T. 0. Stanley Booth Co. v. Bank of El
Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. 1992).

9. See id. at 243-49.
10. See id. at 249-50.
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INFORMAL MARRIAGE

The ever-present foes of the institution of informal marriage (marshaled by the unsuccessful counsel in Estate of Claveria v. Claveria'1) significantly crippled the doctrine in 1989 by amending the Family Code to
provide that any assertion of an informal marriage was required to be
brought within one year of the end of alleged marital cohabitation. 12 In
Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Fuentes13 (without expressing any
doubt of its constitutional validity), 14 the Supreme Court of Texas reiterated its conclusion in Mossier v. Shields1 5 that the one-year statute of
limitation, if effectively asserted, bars reliance on an informal marriage.
That statute was also fatal to a tardy effort to disprove an alleged informal 1993 marriage in Lavely v. Heafner.1 6 In 1995, however, the Family
Code was again amended to provide that if an informal marriage is not
asserted for a period of two years after termination of a cohabital relationship, there is merely a presumption of no agreement to marry between the parties.1 7 This amendment controls all suits commenced after
September 1, 1995, but does not affect those suits already barred by the
1989 act. 18 In 1997 section 2.401 was also amended' 9 to provide that a
minor (without mention of removal of disabilities of minority) may not be
a party to an informal marriage or execute a declaration of informal marriage (as though the declaration might somehow be effective despite the
lack of an informal marriage to declare). But the Legislature nevertheless left provisions in place by which parental consent might be given for
such marriages.
In Lee v. Lee 20 a wife brought suit for divorce in April 1994 after she
and her husband had ceased living together in January of that year. The
11. 615 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1981).
12. For a brief legislative history of the enactment of § 1.91(b), Act of June 14, 1989,
1989 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 369, § 9 at 1461 (effective Sept. 1, 1989), see Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1990).
See also Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. 1998). In 1989 the opponents of the
principle of informal marriage also achieved suppression of the provision of § 1.91, enacted
in 1969 to codify the conclusion in Consolidated Underwriters v. Kelly, 15 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.
Comm'n. App. 1929, judgment adopted), aff'g Kelly v. Consolidated Underwriters, 300
S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1927), that an agreement of a couple to be married might be inferred from a finding of cohabitation as a married couple and their holding
themselves out to the public as married. The substantive effects of this amendment were
defined in Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1993).
13. Sub nom Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 35 (Tex. 1998). For a discussion of
this decision see McKnight, supra note 4, at 1049-50.
14. See White v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (E.D. Tex.
1995). But see Dannelley v. Almond, 827 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, no writ).
15. 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1991).
16. 976 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
17. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
18. See Lavely, 976 S.W.2d at 898 n.2. As dealt with on motion for rehearing, Simpson
and Angerer v. Patel, No. 07-97-0107-CV, 1998 WL 389012 (Tex. App.-Amarillo July 13,
1998), seems to be a case on point.
19. See 1997 Texas Laws, ch. 1362, § 1.
20. 981 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
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couple had been ceremonially married in December 1993, but at the trial,
which commenced in October 1995, the court allowed an amendment of
the wife's pleading that an informal marriage had existed between the
parties since January 1992. The trial court found that the informal marriage had been proved. In his appeal the husband did not appear to have
raised a point of error on the timeliness of the trial amendment under the
1989 act, which had not been repealed, though some of its provisions had
been amended by the 1995 act. Rather, the husband contested the trial
court's finding that the couple had held themselves out to the public as
married, and thus, in the absence of this vital element of informal marriage, the existence of the informal marriage had been erroneously found.
With one judge dissenting, the appellate court concluded that several isolated instances when the wife asserted their marriage to relatives and
friends and some references to her as "Mrs. Lee" by customers and
friends did not constitute compliance with the statutory requirement of
holding themselves out to the public as being married. 21 While relying on
Winfield v. Renfro22 and Estate of Giessel,23 the majority of the court
stressed that each case must turn on its own particular circumstances. In
this instance, the majority concluded that the alleged husband had failed
to hold the woman out to the public as his wife. 24
The assertion of an informal marriage in Villegas v. Griffin Industries2 5
fell to two fatal obstacles. Though the court seems to have assumed that
the facts were sufficient to prove the elements of an informal marriage,
the one-year statute of limitation for proof of the marriage was in effect
when the suit was brought. 26 Thus, even if the marriage met all the requirements of a valid informal marriage, its assertion of validity was
barred. Further, because the husband had a living wife at the time the
marriage was contracted, the informal marriage would have been void
until the impediment was removed. Though that informal marriage
would have been treated as valid once the impediment was removed,2 7
there was no proof that the impediment had been removed prior to the
husband's death. Finally, the alleged wife was unable to show that she
was a putative wife of the decedent because she knew of the impediment.
Even if she had acted in good faith and without knowledge of the impediment and thus was a putative wife, she would still have been barred from
recovery for her husband's wrongful death because a putative spouse
lacks standing to sue for such a cause of action as a matter of law. 28
21. See id. at 907.
22. 821 S.W.2d 640, 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
23. 734 S.W.2d 27, 31-32 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
24. In her dissenting opinion Justice Mirabal responded to this conclusion by saying
that there was considerably more than a scintilla of evidence to support the assertion of an
agreement to marry and of holding each other out as husband and wife in Texas. Cohabitation of spouses was apparently conceded.
25. 975 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
26. See id. at 749 n.1.
27. See id. at 750 n.4.
28. See id. at 749.
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In two other civil actions that reached the appellate courts, proof of
informal marriages presented some difficult evidentiary questions. Ballesteros v. Jones29 was a suit brought by an allegedly informally married
woman against her attorney for professional malpractice after he had recommended and negotiated an inadequate settlement prior to a trial for
divorce. It was therefore necessary that the woman prove the validity of
her informal marriage, and in this case, after he had already received a
beneficial settlement, she had the advantage of her alleged husband's
favorable testimony. The woman was able to demonstrate to a jury's satisfaction that the relationship of seventeen years duration eventually constituted a valid marriage once two impediments were removed: (1) the
woman's own marriage existing at the start of the relationship and terminated by divorce and (2) the man's marriage, which was finally terminated by his wife's death. After the removal of both impediments, the
alleged marital relationship subsisted for seven years during which all the
elements of an informal marriage were proved to have existed. 30 The
evidence supporting the jury's verdict seems to have been remarkably
thin.3 1 Despite a considerable conflict of evidence on holding themselves
out to the public as husband and wife, the Dallas Court of Appeals also
sustained the trial court's finding of an informal marriage in Pickens v.
Broadwater.3 2 In criminal cases, however, efforts to prove informal marriages in order to suppress evidence of an alleged spouse were less
successful. 33
C.

INTERSPOUSAL TORTS

The point most frequently overlooked in relation to interspousal torts
is that prior to the Texas Supreme Court's decision to abrogate the doctrine of spousal immunity in Bounds v. Caudle3 there was no clear recognition of tortious liability between spouses. 35 Despite some misty
observations concerning actionability of claims for actual fraud in relation
to dispositions of community property, the remedy available for such acts
29. 985 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). This is an en banc review
on motion for rehearing. It is striking that roughly five years elapsed from the date of the
motion and the substituted opinion, during which time all of the judges who had constituted the original panel had left the court.
30. The trial jury found that an informal marriage had been proved but the trial judge
granted the attorney's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The appellate
court reversed this conclusion because the verdict was supported by some evidence.
31. Although the cohabital relationship of the man and woman had evidently ceased
for over a year prior to her filing suit for divorce in 1988, the trial began prior to enactment
of the 1989 statute.
32. No. 05-96-00614-CV, 1997 WL 796998 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 31, 1997).
33. See, e.g., Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Medel v. State,
No. 01-97-00960-CR, 1998 WL 653459 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 24, 1998);
Aylor v. State, No. 04-94-00759-CR, 1997 WL 136479, (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 26,
1997).
34. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
35. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 110 (1978).
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was far from clear.3 6 Thus, in the absence of a defined doctrine of tortious liability there were no interspousaltorts. Since Bounds was decided,
however, there has been a tendency among many lawyers to assume that
the rules of tortious liability between spouses is the same as that prevailing among strangers. In the absence of any prior rules, that conclusion
seems unjustifiable. A determination of the scope of the doctrine of interspousal torts has just begun. The Texas Supreme Court has a difficult
road ahead in this regard.
Thus far the court has only considered a spouse's fraudulent misrepresentation of a pending divorce proceeding in relation to the running of
the statute of limitation. 37 More recently in Schlueter v. Schlueter38 the
court distinguished a right of reimbursement for hiding community assets
in anticipation of divorce and tortious liability for the infliction of physical injury and emotional distress. In Schlueter the wife, as respondent and
counter-petitioner in a suit for divorce, sought damages against her husband (and his father for assisting him) for secreting community assets in
anticipation of divorce. Prior to filing his petition for divorce the husband had not only sold a business to his father at a price that was somewhat less than its value but had also transferred a significant amount of
money to him. The jury found that $12,850 would compensate the community estate for their acts and also awarded punitive damages of
$50,000 against the husband and $15,000 against his father. In three instances over the last twenty-five years the Texas Supreme Court has allowed recovery for interspousal personal injury claims, the most recent of
which was a divorce case. 39 In each instance, however, the recovery constituted the separate property of the injured spouse. Although the acts
complained of in Schlueter were intentional, the proprietary deprivation
that resulted was not against a separate interest. Here the majority of the
court drew the line between the sort of recovery allowed between spouses
and that which is not actionable: Interspousal tortious recovery may be
had for loss to a separate property interest but not for secreting community property in anticipation of a divorce proceeding, though the divorce
court may award a monetary judgment for restitution of monetary loss to
the community estate if there is insufficient community property on hand
for that purpose. Because there is no independent tort cause of action for
wrongful disposition of community assets, the wronged spouse cannot re36. See Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211, 215 (1855); Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S.W.2d 1219
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, no writ); Bettis v. Bettis, 83 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1935, no writ); Dunn v. Vinyard, 234 S.W. 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1921); affd on other grounds, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm., App. 1923, recommendation
adopted) (summarizing the pre-1913 law of actual fraud).
37. See Oliver v. Oliver, 889 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. 1994), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REv. 1225, 123031 (1995).
38. 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998).
39. See Bounds, 560 S.W.2d at 925; Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987); Twyman
v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). The issue of damages was not alluded to in Oliver
v. Oliver, 888 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. 1994).
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cover punitive damages from the other spouse.4 0 Although the casual use
of such phrases as "community recovery" or "fraud on the community"
may sometimes so suggest, "the community estate" is not an entity that
may assert a claim in a divorce context or any other. 4' Such phrases are
merely figures of legal speech rather than terms of art. Although the
court did not discuss the point, the community estate in such instances is
made whole by a right of reimbursement, which entails neither an award
of interest or punitive damages. 42 It appears to follow that in the reimbursement context the distinction between intent to harm the other
spouse in making such a disposition of community property is no longer
significant. As to "the heightened culpability of actual fraud" on the husband's part,4 3 the trial court may consider it in making the division of
community property on divorce. 4 4 Finally, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney's fees for the wife, not because of any relationship to the recovery denied for exemplary damages but because of its
45
apparent penal effect with respect to the successful appellant-husband.
The community property disposed of in In re Herring46 was meant to
be kept by the recipient rather than returned to the spouse who transferred it, and the transfer was not made in anticipation of divorce. In
Herring the wife on several occasions made gifts of community funds to
her son by a prior marriage without her husband's knowledge. Over four
years after the wife's death the husband brought suit against the administrator of his wife's estate and the son for the money transferred as a constructive fraud and also sought damages for conspiracy. The defendants
asserted that the plaintiff had discovered the transfer (or should have discovered the transfer) over four years before bringing suit and that his
claim was therefore barred by the four-years statute of limitation for the
transfer 47 and by the two-years statute of limitation for conspiracy. 48 A
summary judgment was rendered in favor of both defendants on the basis
of the statutes of limitation, and the plaintiff pursued his appeal only
against the transferee-son. The appellate court held that a conspiracy
claim would have been barred by the two-years statute. The later decision in Schlueter precludes an interspousal tortious claim as subsumed in
the right of marital reimbursement. Because a right of reimbursement
does not arise until the marriage terminates,4 9 the applicable statute of
limitation begins to run as soon thereafter as the plaintiff knew or ought
40. See Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 589.
41. Just as a decedent's estate is not an entity as the court pointed out in Gregg v.
Barron, 977 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.), the community estate
is not an entity in that or other contexts.
42. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
43. The award of exemplary damages against the husband's father, nevertheless, stood
because no appeal was taken from it.
44. See Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 589.
45. See id. at 590.
46. 970 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
47. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.004(a)(3) (Vernon 1986).
48. See id. § 16.003(a).
49. See Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964).
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to have known the facts supporting the constructively fraudulent disposition.50 In this instance the court held that the four-years statute had not
51
run on the transfer.
D.

SPOUSAL GUARDIANSHIP

The capacity of one spouse to act as guardian of the person or property
of the other spouse was only moderately explored by the appellate court
in Trimble v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Service.52
Though the husband objected to the appointment of a state agency as
guardian of his mentally incapacitated (but ambulatory) wife, the trial
court exercised its judgment in favor of the agency as the guardian of her
person and property in light of the husband's inability to serve and the
refusal of other family members to undertake responsibility for her situation. As to guardianship of his wife's estate, the husband interposed his
power under section 883 of the Probate Code to manage the community
estate when his spouse was judicially declared incompetent. 53 The appellate court pointed out that the trial court's exercise of its discretion in
favor of appointment of the agency was nonetheless proper although the
husband might, under section 884, demand control of the community es54
tate, but he had failed to do so.
In a very different context, the court in Stubbs v. Ortega55 once more
held that a spouse's guardian might institute and maintain a suit for that
spouse's divorce. 56 In that context, however, the other spouse would
seem clearly unable to act as guardian of the incapable spouse.
E.

STATE EMPLOYMENT

Texas has long maintained rules against spousal nepotism in state employment in order to avoid favoritism in appointment of spouses to state
offices of profit when the other spouse exercises the power to appoint.
Aspects of these statutes were discussed in two opinions of the Texas Attorney General.
As in the administration of other statutory regulations there are instances of seeming iniquities. In June 1996 the Brooks Independent
School District closed its school in Encino, and as a consequence many of
the teachers resigned their positions as school district employees, though
a lawsuit was brought to reestablish the school. During the following
50. See id. at 565.
51. See Herring, 970 S.W.2d at 590.
52. 958 S.W. 2d 906 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

53. See

TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.

§ 883 (Vernon 1987).

54. See Trimble, 958 S.W.2d at 914.
55. 977 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
56. See id. at 722 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 576.001 (Vernon
1992). See also Wahlenmaier v. Wahlenmaier, 750 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso
1988, writ denied). See generally Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1989). For jurisdiction of a probate
court in such matters see In re Graham, 971 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1998).
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year the husband of one of those teachers who had resigned was elected
to the school district board. The lawsuit was thereafter successfully pursued with the result that the district reopened the closed school and
sought the opinion of the Attorney General whether it might rehire the
school board member's wife, who had been employed by the school district for twenty-five years prior to her resignation. 57 The response was
that to do so would be a violation of the Texas statute. 58 There is an
exception to the application of the rule transgressed: If the person appointed had previously held the position for a long term "immediately
before" the election at which the spouse was elected. 59 In this instance,
however, the teacher had not been employed by the school board "immediately before" the election but by a private group which was conducting
a school in the facilities by permission of the board while the public
school was closed. The literal interpretation of the statute produced a
very harsh result.
In another instance the anti-nepotism rule was not seen to be violated. 60 In 1995 the Randall County criminal district attorney employed a
paid victim-assistance coordinator. Because the district attorney and the
victim-assistance coordinator planned to be married, and because paid
positions tend to invoke the provisions of the anti-nepotism law and unpaid positions do not, the district attorney and the sheriff, who had an
unfilled position of an unpaid crime-victim liaison on his staff, suggested
that the position in the district attorney's office be made an unpaid position and the position in the sheriff's office be made a paid position. 6 1 The
County Commissioners changed the descriptions of the two positions.
Thereafter the position of victim-assistance coordinator continued to be
filled by the incumbent without pay, and the sheriff also hired her to fill
the newly-compensated position of crime-victim liaison. After the district
attorney and the dually-titled liaison-coordinator were married, the Attorney General was asked whether there was a breach of anti-nepotism
rules. The Attorney General first stated that "it does not appear, from
the facts you have presented, that the prosecutor and the sheriff have
contravened chapter 573 by trading otherwise prohibited nepotistic appointments" and concluded that no violation of the anti-nepotism rules
62
had occurred.
F. Loss OF CONSORTIUM
In Howard v. Fiesta Texas Show Park, Inc.,63 the appellate court once

again stressed the derivative nature of a spouse's claim for loss of consortium. Thus, any defense that defeats the claim of the primary victim pre57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. LO-98-046 (1998).
See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.041 (Vernon 1988).
Id. § 573.062(a).
See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. LO-98-098 (1998).
See id.
Id.
980 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
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cludes recovery by the derivate claimant as well. 64
II.

CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY

A.

PREMARITAL PARTITION

The waning incidence of appellate contest of the validity of premarital
partitions suggests either that in recent years such arrangements have
been less frequently employed or that they are being more skillfully negotiated, drawn, and executed. 65 Commentators nonetheless continue to
stress ethical concerns in drafting such agreements as well as other pitfalls
66
of negotiation.
The premarital agreement at issue in Bernhardt v. Scheifley 67 had been
executed in 1970, a decade before a partition of future community assets
was authorized. The agreement provided correlatively that each spouse's
separate property along with "all increases thereof, additions thereto, and
mutations thereof," should remain separate and subject to the owner's
sole control and that "any expenditure ... made by the parties for the
conservation, preservation, or maintenance" of separate estates during
the marriage that might give rise to a reimbursement claim by the community estate should "inure to the sole benefit of the party" whose separate property was benefited. 68 The spouses died within two years of each
other, and each estate sought an interpretation of the terms of the agreement in its favor. The wife's executrix asserted that all income of separate properties was community property, whereas the husband's executor
argued that the terms of the agreement provided that all income from
separate properties was the separate property of the spouse whose property produced the income. Although there was no seeming contest of
invalidity of the partition, each estate moved for summary judgment in
reliance on the curious conclusion of the Texas Supreme Court in Beck v.
Beck 69 that the 1980 constitutional amendment was meant to validate
such prior undertakings. 70 The trial court found for the husband's estate,
and the wife's executrix appealed. The Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded that neither estate was entitled to summary judgment, because the
agreement was ambiguous and remanded the case to the trial court.
If the agreement in Bernhardtis examined in the context of the law at
the time it was entered into, its meaning is fairly clear in the absence of
64. See id. at 719 (citing Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 738-39 (Tex.
1980)).
65. The latter suggestion seems borne out by the wife's failure to pursue her appellate
attack on validity of the antenuptial agreement in Lueg v. Lueg, 976 S.W.2d 308, 309, 312
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
66. See Dennis L. Becker & Laura 0. Pomeroy, For Richer,for Poorer: Strategiesfor
PremaritalAgreements, 12 PROB. & PROP. 54 (1998); Lewis Becker, Ethical Concerns in
Negotiating Family Law Agreements, 30 FAM. L.Q. 587 (1996).
67. No. 09-96-404-CV, 1998 WL 472491 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Aug. 13, 1998).
68. Id. at *1.
69. 814 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex. 1991). See generally Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1831, 1839-41 (1992).
70. See id. at 749 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1876, as amended)).

1154

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

controlling evidence of the intent of the parties that might be gleaned
from external sources. Few, if any, informed lawyers in 1970 would have
felt altogether confident of success when providing in a premarital partition that income from separate property could be defined as separate
property, though the provision that neither party could claim a right to
reimbursable benefits rendered to separate property on the part of the
community estate is not beyond what a lawyer of the time might have
regarded as subject to agreement. Thus, the meaning of "additions" to
separate property is reasonably clear. As to "mutations" of separate
property, that is a term of art meaning changes in form that do not affect
the character of the property. Though the term was not used in the statute defining separate property, it has been a defining element of the community management statute (now section 3.012) since its enactment in
1967. 7 1 The term "increase" had been removed from the statute defining
separate property when the provision of the 1967 act became effective on
January 1, 1968,72 but its history as a term of art not including income and
revenues from separate property dates back to the decision of the Texas
Supreme Court in Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co. 73 in 1859. Thus, carefully

analyzed, the language of the agreement in Bernhardt is not ambiguous.
B.

TRACING

1. Commingled Accounts
The initial factor in characterizing property acquired by a married
couple is the presumption that all property acquired during marriage is
community property.7 4 In the absence of proof that an acquisition was
made lucratively as opposed to onerously, the community presumption
75
prevails.
Until the early 1970s funds in active accounts were treated by appellate
76
courts as beyond segregation into separate and community increments.
Then Sibley v. Sibley 77 began to be relied on for the proposition that
funds removed from an account of commingled separate and community
funds were presumed to be community withdrawals. Although the Sibley
decision did not stand for that proposition,78 the alleged authority
seemed to fill a perceived need for a means of tracing commingled community and separate funds in an active account that has been accepted by
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (Vernon Supp. 1999), formerly § 5.22.
72. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (Vernon Supp. 1999), formerly § 4619 of the
1967 act and § 5.02 of the Family Code of 1969.
73. 23 Tex. 25 (1859).
74. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
75. See Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972). See also Scott v. Estate of
Scott, 973 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).
76. See McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543-44 (Tex. 1973) (involving the
$16,000 Dallas Federal Savings certificate).
77. 286 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
78. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 93, 104-05 (1981).
71.
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many intermediate appellate courts.79 Hill v. Hill80 is a recent example.
At marriage the husband had an account in which $7500 of separate
property had been deposited. During the marriage that account was depleted to $4900 before the deposit of a gift of $10,000 was made to the
account to bring the level of the account to $14,900. Due to withdrawals
the account was then depleted to $7900. Another gift of $14,700 was deposited to bring the balance to $22,600. Many other uncharacterized deposits and withdrawals were made to and from the account. The court
assumed that these withdrawals "consumed first the community and then
the separate funds." 81 The lowest balance was $17,300, which was
thought to be separate property only. Hence, the trial court's award to
82
the husband of that amount as his separate property was affirmed.
Thus, the tracing doctrine has succumbed, at least in part, to techniques
of accounting, but the underlying reasons on which the accounting is
based seem meritless.
In Sibley the husband as custodian for his wife of her separate property
deposited her funds in a community bank account. On divorce, the wife
sought return of her property. After the wife's funds had been deposited
in her husband's account, many payments had been made from the account, but the account balance had never dipped below the amount of the
wife's funds deposited there. The appellate court held that the husbandfiduciary was deemed to have paid out community funds before exhausting any of the wife's funds. This holding based on fiduciary principles has
been often cited in support of the proposition that in any situation of
commingling of separate property with community funds, the community
funds will be deemed to be paid out first. 83 Such citation is a gross misstatement of the holding in Sibley. But by treating each withdrawal as a
transaction,the conclusion may still be defended as an application of the
community presumption. Even so, each withdrawal is more properly
characterized as being of the same character as the fund from which it
was taken. That is, if the fund at the time of withdrawal is forty percent
separate and sixty percent community, the withdrawal should reflect the
same mix. 84 The decision in Sibley, however, actually rested on neither a
79. See Barrington v. Barrington, 290 S.W.2d 297, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1956, no writ); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd) (a wholly gratuitous observation); Harris v. Ventura, 582 S.W.2d
853, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); Snider v. Snider, 613 S.W.2d 8, 11
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ); Gibson v. Gibson, 614 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); Anderson v. Gilliland, 677 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 684 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1985); Welder v. Welder, 794

S.W.2d 420, 425, 432, 433 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); Hill v. Hill, 971
S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.); and Camp v. Camp, 972 S.W.2d 906
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
80. 971 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.). The figures given in the text
have been rendered in nearest hundreds of dollars.
81. Id. at 159.
82. See id.

83. See, e.g.,
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
84. See Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851); Duncan v. United States, 247 F.2d 845 (5th
Cir. 1957).
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transactional nor a proportionate withdrawal analysis but on a principle
of fiduciary duty.8 5 When he had mixed his wife's separate funds in an
account containing community funds, the fiduciary-husband was deemed
to deplete funds subject to his own control before those received in his
86
fiduciary capacity.
The principle of presumed community withdrawal from any commingled fund that is said to rest on Sibley does not actually rest on Sibley but
on misattributions to Sibley. If a spouse mixes his own separate funds
with those of the community, all withdrawals should have the same proportional content as the funds from which they came. Applying a more
rigorous fiduciary standard, all withdrawals for a frivolous, wasteful, or
unexplained purpose could be charged to the separate estate of the managing spouse leaving community property as the residue.
A dispute in Hunt v. Hunt8 7 also involved the characterization of funds
withdrawn from a bank account. The husband's ledger showed that he
had deposited the proceeds of $23,800 payable to him under his father's
life insurance policy to a checking account at that time showing a balance
of less than $6000, presumed to be community property. He also showed
from his ledger that he had then withdrawn over $13,000 from the account to purchase a motor home. The prior separate deposit and the
amount of the purchase were deemed sufficient by the Eastland court to
sustain the trial court's finding that the purchase was wholly from the
separate funds. 88 The conclusion does not seem based on any rational
principle.
The decision in Bahr v. Kohn 89 turned on the inability of the wife to
trace separate assets. After a large judgment had been rendered against
the husband in Maryland, the couple acquired 263 rural acres of Texas
land and made it their home. Sometime thereafter the judgment creditors filed their judgment in the county where the land was located. The
couple promptly transferred 63 non-homestead acres to the wife with a
recital that she had furnished the purchase price with her separate property. The judgment creditors then brought suit against the couple to assert that the conveyance to the wife was a fraudulent transfer of the
debtor-husband's assets. The defendants denied the plaintiffs' assertion
without any pleading or affirmative defense but were allowed to introduce evidence that the funds for purchase of the entire acreage came
from the wife's separate funds as recited in the deed to the wife. The
court properly rejected the plaintiffs' arguments concerning admissibility
85. See Sibley, 286 S.W.2d at 660-61.
86. See Giesler v. Giesler, 309 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no
writ); Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Houston [14th Dist.] 1966, no writ); Trevino
v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792, 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Kuehn v.
Kuehn, 594 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ); Duncan
v. United States, 247 F.2d 845, 854 (5th Cir. 1957).
87. 952 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
88. See id. at 567.
89. 980 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
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of the defendants' evidence and went on to consider the tracing issue.
While living outside Texas, the couple had sold a farm in New Jersey at a
considerable profit. Although it was alleged that some of the assets used
to buy the farm had been a gift to the wife from her mother, the couple
seems to have relied principally on a partition of the proceeds of sale as
proof of the separate character of the wife's funds ultimately used to buy
the Texas realty. But whether or how that partition had taken place and
how the funds maintained their separate character within the account
were not explained, though there was evidence that funds from a New
Jersey bank account into which the wife had deposited her allegedly partitioned share of the proceeds of sale had been used to make the Texas
land purchase. All considered, the wife's evidence fell considerably short
of tracing her separate funds into the Texas realty. 90
2.

Creation of a Corporation

In Hunt the court also concluded that a corporation created during the
marriage was a separate corporation because it was capitalized with separate property, in that instance equipment acquired by the incorporating
spouse prior to his marriage and hence the spouse's separate property. 9 1
By application of the principle that the corporation has no reality until
capitalized, this conclusion seems sound in that any other test would preclude the creation of a separate corporate interest during marriage.
C.

INCEPTION OF TITLE

1.

Acquisitions Made Priorto Marriage and After Divorce
As a general rule property acquired prior to marriage and after divorce
are the separate property of the acquiring future spouse or ex-spouse.
Thus, a partnership interest in real property and a mineral royalty-interest acquired prior to marriage and an interest in a partnership formed
before marriage to handle particular personal property (e.g., helicopters)
were so characterized in Hunt.92 Similarly, earnings of an ex-spouse subsequent to divorce are separate property. 93
90. See id. at 728-30.
91. See id. (relying on Allen v. Allen, 704 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no
writ) (incorporation after 8 months of marriage of proprietorship formed prior to marriage
but without any showing of the marital character of the property used for capitalization).
See also Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. 1982) (incorporation of business
during marriage with capitalization supplied with both separate and community property
in determined amounts); Holloway v. Holloway, 671 S.W.2d 51, 56-57 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, writ dism'd) (corporation formed during marriage and capitalized with separate
property is separate property); In re York, 613 S.W.2d 764, 769-70 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1981, no writ) (a corporation formed and capitalized with both separate and community
assets during marriage); and TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT arts. 3.04-3.05 (Vernon 1980 & Supp.
1999)).
92. See id. at 567-68.
93. See Butler v. Butler, 975 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no
pet.). See also Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of
Texas Law 44 Sw. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1990) (cash payment for contract of service performed after
divorce under contract entered into during marriage).
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In Phillips v. Phillips94 the ex-wife claimed a part of the proceeds of
sale of grain planted prior to divorce but harvested afterwards. Apparently relying on federal regulations with respect to crop insurance and
disaster relief funds received for the partial failure of prospective crops,
the trial and appellate courts concluded that the crops were "in existence" prior to the divorce because planting the crops had already beof a crop
gun. 95 Old Spanish law also concluded that the characterization
96
depended on marital status when the crop was planted.
2.

Term Life Insurance Policy

In Camp v. Camp 97 the husband, who had acquired a term policy of life
insurance prior to marriage, named his mother as the beneficiary of the
policy. His widow contested the designation on the ground that the policy was community property. In affirming the trial court's judgment in
favor of the mother 98 the Corpus Christi court relied wholly on the provision of section 312.011 (13) of the Government Code that life insurance
policies and "the effects of life insurance policies" are property. 99 The
wife's only argument in favor of reversal was that an interest in a term life
insurance policy was "too ephemeral to constitute property." 100 The
court, therefore, stressed the statutory phrase "the effects of life insurance policies." 10 The court might, at least, have cited Estate of Cavenaugh v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue'0 2 in support of its
conclusion.
D.

CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY

At the time of the trial of the wife's suit for divorce in Osborn v. Osborn103 both the husband and wife had pending suits for injury. The husband failed to appear at the trial for divorce, and the court, presumably
applying the community presumption, 1°4 found that the husband's chose
in action was wholly community property and in its division of community property awarded part of the husband's potential recovery to his
wife. The Houston Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for
re-division. The court observed that "[t]here is no presumption that a
potential recovery for personal injuries to the body of a spouse is commu94. 951 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
95. Id. at 956.
96. See JUAN MATIENCO, COMMENTARIA IN LIBRUM

QUINTUM

RECOLLECTIONES

LEGUM HISPANAE (1580) on RECOP. V. 9.4 gl. 1, no. 4 at 264, commented on in JOSEPH W.
MCKNIGHT & WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 47-48 (2d ed.

1998).
97. 972 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
98. See id. at 909.
99. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.011 (13) (Vernon 1988 & 1999 Supp.).

100. Camp, 972 S.W.2d at 909.
101. Id.
102. 51 F.3d 597, 601-05 (5th Cir. 1995). See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1238-40 (1995).
103. 961 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
104. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
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nity property" and indicated that various aspects of the spouses' recovery
might be of a separate or community character. 05 That assertion is, of
course, incorrect. In saying that any estimate by the husband or wife as
to the dollar amount of recovery would be purely speculative in such circumstances, the appellate court seemed to hold that any tort actions between spouses must be resolved before a division of the community
10 6
property can be made.
E.

RETIREMENT BENEFITS

In Lipsey v. Lipsey, 0 7 the wife on divorce asserted a community interest in her husband's retirement trust, a section 401(k) capital accumulation plan. The husband had retired prior to their marriage. The corpus of
the trust had considerably increased in value during the marriage due to
increases in the market value of the portfolio and additions to the corpus
by accumulation of gains realized by the sale of investments and dividends from securities held as part of the trust corpus. The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals held that these additions during marriage were all made
in accordance with the premarital terms of the trust in full compliance
with federal regulations without any apparent participation of the beneficiary-husband. 10 8 The trust corpus evidently included no marital compensation from the retired employee and the community estate had no
interest in the trust corpus. The court expressed no opinion on the character of discretionary distributions from the trust during marriage (of
which there were none in this instance), but in light of Lemke v.
Lemke, 10 9 decided by the same court in 1997, the court would likely have
rejected the argument that such distributions would have had a community character.
In dividing the community element of retirement benefits, to which a
spouse is, or may become, entitled to a portion, a divorce decree should
define the portion of the payments to which the non-pensioner is, or will
be, entitled with as much precision as possible. The community element
is usually computed by using a mathematical formula in terms of the pensioner's present or future entitlement. In Albrecht v. AlbrechtO° the exhusband-pensioner appealed the divorce court's order defining the exwife's share of his military pension rights after less than five years of marriage. Apparently because of the husband's failure to present evidence of
the value of his pension interest at divorce, the trial court used the
formula prescribed in Taggart v. Taggart"' to define the non-pensioner's
105. Id. at 414.
106. See id. at 414-15.
107. 983 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
108. See id. at 351.
109. 929 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet.). This case is discussed in
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 50
SMU L. REv. 1189, 1200-01 (1997).
110. 974 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
111. 552 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. 1977).

1160

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

share. In Taggart, however, the formula defined the value of the retirement benefits at retirement rather than value of the benefits at divorce
because the divorcing pensioner was already retired in that instance. The
Taggart formula also specified the years (or months) of service at retirement rather than years (or months) of service at divorce for the same
reason.'12 In Taggart it was necessary to compute the value of the nonpensioner-spouse's interest in the pension benefit because the pensioner
was already retired.1 13 In the case of an unretired pensioner, the differences in the formulas used are significant because of the Texas Supreme
Court's direction in Berry v. Berry1 14 that the non-pensioner's interest in
the retirement benefits of an unretired pensioner is limited to the value of
the pension interest at the date of divorce. Otherwise the pensionerspouse would be deprived of what would be a separate property interest
in his pension benefits accruing after the divorce. Thus, in Albrecht, the
San Antonio appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for a redivision of the pension interest by using the Berry formula.
The problems dealt with only a few weeks earlier by a slightly different
panel of the San Antonio court in Contreras v. Contreras'1 5 was vastly
more complicated. In that instance, several years after the divorce decree
(and long after an appeal might have been pursued) the ex-wife moved
for clarification of her interest in her ex-husband's military retirement
benefits. At the time of divorce the husband had not retired, but he had
retired by the time the clarification order was entered. What the trial
court had purported to enter as an order clarifying the divorce decree
actually went beyond clarification to change the original division of the
community portion of the retirement benefits contrary to Family Code
section 3.71 (now section 9.007)116 by substituting a version of the Berry
formula for that of the Taggart formula in the original decree. 117 The
appellate court evidently appreciated the great difficulty of wording an
appropriate order for division of the community portion of the retirement
benefits of the ex-husband (who for almost thirty years had served in the
Marine Corps, a military reserve unit, and the Army) and at the same
time not running afoul of the provisions of section 9.007. The court therefore directed the trial court to seek the assistance of the military service
1 18
paying the benefits to calculate those benefits.

112. For a comparison of the two formulas see Albrecht, 974 S.W.2d at 263-64.
113. See id.
114. 647 S.W.2d 945, 946-47 (Tex. 1983). See also May v. May, 716 S.W.2d 705, 710
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
115. 974 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (Hardberger, C. J. and
L6pez and Green, JJ. constituted the panel. In Albrecht, Angelini, J. replaced Green, J.
but in both instances L6pez, J. wrote the opinion of the court.)

116. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 9.007 (Vernon Supp. 1999).

117. See Albrecht, 974 S.W.2d at 157-58.
118. See id. at 158-59.

HUSBAND AND WIFE

1999]
F.

RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT

In several recent appellate cases dealing with dissolution of marriage
on divorce, the court has discussed claims for reimbursement of the community estate for support of spouses and children of former marriages. 1 9
The issue was again discussed in Butler v. Butler120 with respect to support of an illegitimate child born of the husband during the marriage.
The trial court found that $30,000 of community funds had been expended for such support and that amount should be awarded to the wife.
Distinguishing the holding in Norris v. Vaughan1 21 (as to non-reimbursement of separate property used for living expenses) as applying only to
familial support and relying on section 154.069(a), 122 the court justified
the amount of community reimbursement on the ground that "because
[the wife's] net resources are excluded from consideration in setting [the
husband's] child support obligation, the obligee is restricted to looking
only to [the husband] for satisfaction of [his] individual child support obligation."' 123 The court also distinguished its denial of reimbursement in
Pelzig v. Berkebile1 2 4 because the wife in that instance had full knowledge
of the husband's prior support obligations before she married him and
neither before nor during marriage did she seek to prevent the use of
community funds for their discharge or satisfaction. In Butler, on the
other hand, the wife did not know of the husband's child or his use of
community funds for its support. In light of the right of each spouse to
sole management of earnings and income from that spouse's separate
property, this distinction is unconvincing except to refute the soundness
of the conclusion in Pelzig.125 In seeming further refutation of its reasoning in Pelzig, the court went on to say that the situation before it in Butler
was analogous to that of an award of community reimbursement for a
husband's expenditures on women other than his wife during marriage. 126

119. For a discussion of some of these cases see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 51 SMU L. REV. 1047, 1059-60 (1998) and
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 50
SMU L. REV. 1189, 1210-13 (1997).
120. 975 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
121. 152 Tex. 491, 502-03, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953).
122. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.069(a) (Vernon 1996) (no reliance on net resources of the spouse of the obligor in calculating amount of child support was to be ordered). The court seemed to treat this section as referring to resources of the wife, the
present spouse of the father of the child.
123. Butler, 975 S.W.2d at 769.
124. 931 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
125. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1089, 1212 (1997), with respect to lack of consent of one spouse for
the other's handling of solely managed community property.
126. See Butler, 975 S.W.2d at 769 (citing Morrison v. Morrison, 713 S.W.2d 377, 379
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ dism'd)).
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CONTROL AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A.

MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY

The dispute in Ozlat v. Hua and Nguyen 127 turned on section 3.104 of
the Family Code. The husband was the record title holder of a residential
lot on which a house was in course of construction by his arrangement.
The husband entered into a written earnest-money contract with the
plaintiffs to sell the completed house and lot. The seller presumably later
found a buyer for a better price and therefore refused to carry out his
contract with the buyers who thereupon sued the seller for damages for
breach of contract. The seller's defense was that the property was jointly
managed community property and that his wife had refused to consent to
the sale. The buyers, who were unaware of the managerial status of the
property, relied successfully on the provisions of section 3.104: a third
person dealing with a spouse who holds record title to realty can rely on
that spouse's authority to deal with the property in the absence of knowl128
edge to the contrary.
In First State Bank of Three Rivers v. Martin129 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals dealt with the validity of one spouse's purported renewal of a note and deed of trust lien executed by both spouses. As the
statute of limitation for enforcement of the note and lien was about to
run, the husband unilaterally had purported to renew the obligation once
prior to his wife's death and twice thereafter. The wife died after the
statute of limitation would have run for enforcement of the note and
deed of trust. The purported later extensions of the note and lien were
executed by the surviving husband after he had closed the estate of his
late wife as independent executor. The claimants to the realty subject to
the lien sought to remove the cloud of the lien on their title. The first
purported renewal of the note and lien occurred prior to the running of
the statute of limitation on all installment payments on the note, but the
limitation period had run on the entire note and lien prior to the payee's
effort to foreclose the lien if the husband'sfirst renewal of the note was
invalid.'30 The title to the realty on which the lien was executed was held
in the names of both spouses. Thus, the court concluded that the property over which the lien was asserted had been subject to the joint management of the spouses in the absence of any showing of an agreement
between them to the contrary. 13 1 Hence the husband's unilateral renewal
127. No. 01-97-00568-CV, 1998 WL 255142 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 21,
1998).
128. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
129. 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5129 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied).
130. See TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE §§ 16.004(a)(3), 16.035 (Vernon 1986); First
State Bank of Three Rivers, at *11, *13.
131. See First State Bank of Three Rivers, at *13. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1999); Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 201-02 (Tex.
1974). Although the court's paraphrase of the meaning of section 3.102(c) is somewhat too
broad in light of section 3.102(a) and (b), which the court failed to cite, the court's conclusion is accurate. See also Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary on Title I of the Family Code,
21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 911, 1071, 1076-77 (1990).
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of the note and lien was ineffective during his wife's lifetime. As to his
purported renewal of the obligation on which the statute of limitation had
already run, he had no authority as community survivor to do so, because
he could not have qualified as community survivor after having acted as
the decedent's independent executor, in which capacity he had already
132
closed the administration of her estate.

B.

SPOUSAL DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY

In 1986 the Texas Supreme Court decided that a spouse as co-owner of
an insurance policy might recover against the insurer for a separate inter1 33
est in the property destroyed by the wrongful act of the other spouse.
Thereafter, in five reported appellate instances when a community interest of a spouse was sought to be recovered in similar circumstances, three
innocent spouses failed to recover. 134 The decision of the Houston First
District Court of Appeals in Murphy v. Texas Farmers Insurance Company135 has evened the score. In this as in earlier cases of successful recovery, the interest of the plaintiff-spouse had become a separate
property right either by way of partition by a divorce court or by act of
the parties themselves. In Murphy the spouses had partitioned their community interest in their destroyed community mobile home and the wife
had sued for divorce. Although the Texas Supreme Court had left open
the question of whether the owner of an insured community interest
could recover for the loss caused by a co-insured spouse, the issue on
which claims had previously foundered was the conceptual concern that
the wrongdoer's act had barred the entire recovery, not merely the half of
it for which recovery was not sought. The issue, then, is whether partition
removes that obstacle to allow the innocent claimant to succeed. 136 In
California the death of the wrongdoing spouse or the divorce of the
132. See First State Bank of Three Rivers, at *13-15 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 161 (Vernon 1980)).
133. See Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Insurance Co., 706 S.W.2d 953
(Tex. 1986).
134. See Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Kizer, 943 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1997, writ denied), and two federal cases, Norman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 804
F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1986), commented on in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 1, 19-20 (1987), and Webster v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 953 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1992), commented on in Joseph W. M '
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV.
1475, 1488 (1993).
135. 982 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted Oct. 29, 1998).
The other two recoveries were made in Travelers Companies v. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d 708
(Tex. App.-Amarillo, 1992, no writ); and Saunders v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co.,
928 S.W.2d 322, 324-25 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ), but in the latter case only
as a consequence of the case that preceded it.
136. See Murphy, 982 S.W.2d at 80. It is striking that in every reported instance of an
insurance claim of this sort the subject matter of destruction was a mobile home, but in
only one instance was the homestead use of the property treated as a significant point in
the argument against recovery. See Western Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanchez, 671 S.W.2d 666
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concerning destruction of separate property).
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spouses removes the bar of the innocent spouse. 137
C.

NATURE AND EXTENT OF HOMESTEAD INTEREST

Homestead use of a mobile home was asserted as a significant factor in
a dispute concerning express warranties in a contract of sale. In Nationwide of Bryan, Inc. v. Dyer 138 a husband and wife brought an action
against the seller for breach of contract in relation to the purchase of an
allegedly defective mobile home. The contract of purchase, signed by the
husband only, contained a provision by which both the buyer and seller
agreed to submit any dispute under the contract to arbitration. After experiencing difficulties with the operation of the mobile home and unsuccessful efforts on the part of the seller to perform repairs, the couple
brought suit against the seller for breach of contract. Pursuant to the
arbitration agreement in the contract, the seller requested that the plaintiffs submit the dispute to arbitration. The plaintiffs, however, refused to
arbitrate on the ground that the wife had not signed the contract and
therefore was not bound by that provision. The seller moved to compel
arbitration. The appellate court held that the wife's failure to sign the
contract had no significance due to her status as a third-party beneficiary
of the contract from which she derived her standing to sue on the contract.' 39 As a beneficiary of the contract, the court said, the wife was
bound by its terms.' 40 Further, the court said, the fact that the couple
had made the mobile home a part of their homestead did not make the
arbitration agreement invalid because of the wife's failure to sign it. 14 1 A
contract for purchase of a homestead or for an improvement to a homestead does not require the joinder of both spouses for validity of the contract. 142 The husband-purchaser's agreement to arbitrate was therefore
enforceable. Joinder of the spouse is, of course, necessary to put a lien on
an existing homestead, but the agreement to arbitrate under the contract
of purchase could not be construed either as a home improvement contract or as an encumbrance on the homestead. The metaphorical arguments of the plaintiffs did not change the fact that the agreement to
arbitrate was merely a term of the contract of purchase. 14 3
The Texas Constitution provides that a rural homestead may not consist of more than two hundred acres. 14 The legislature is therefore empowered to define the rural homestead as a smaller area and has done so
by prescribing one hundred acres as the maximum extent of a rural
137. See Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952); Washington v. Washington, 47 Cal.2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956).
138. 969 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
139. See id. at 520.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 520-21.
142. See id. at 521 (citing Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Ditto, 566 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
143. See id. at 520.
144. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (as amended).
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homestead of a single person, 145 whereas a family is entitled to a maximum of two hundred acres. 146 A family survivor, however, continues to
be entitled to the family homestead exemption although that family
member may then be single. This point was re-enunciated in Riley v.
147
Riley.
In Riley the court also applied the rule in Clyde v. Hamilton,148 in
which the Supreme Court of Texas held that a life-tenant is entitled to the
benefits of the open-mine doctrine: if the prior holder from whom the
life-tenant claims opened a mine on the property, his successors may enjoy the benefits of that wasting asset without accounting to the remainderman.149 The difference between the situations in Clyde and Riley is
that Clyde dealt with a testamentary life-estate in a non-marital context
whereas the claimant to the benefit of the open-mine doctrine in Riley
asserted a homestead right to the decedent's separate estate as a matter
of law. The Texarkana court evidently regarded those differences as insignificant. But what is the basis for the application of the open-mine
doctrine? If the life-tenant's enjoyment of the consequences of the openmine doctrine rests significantly on the prior tenant's designation of the
life-tenant as such, it is worth pointing out that Texas homestead law operates independently of the homestead owner's intent and even allows
the surviving spouse to choose the extent and type of property to which
the homestead designation applies, thus, particularly in a rural context,
allowing the remainder interest in a separate estate to be encroached
upon for no other reason than that the prior holder had opened access to
minerals on that property. The court in Riley did not examine this
150
question.
In Riley the widow as surviving family constituent not only chose the
dimensions of the family homestead to include surface areas to her particular liking but also claimed all royalties to minerals from particular acreage within her homestead designation because her description included
bore-sites of producing oil and gas wells. In that respect her claim depended on whether the area in question was within a pooled unit. If it
was, the rule of capture entitled her to share in all the royalties from the
land in question though part of the minerals captured may have come
from adjoining lands. 151 Because the record contained no finding of fact
with respect to whether the area chosen by the widow as part of her rural
homestead was subject to royalty payments or a pooling unit, she was
15 2
allowed as a matter of justice to a remand for findings in those regards.
145. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
146. See id. at § 41.002(b)(1).
147. 972 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
148. 414 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex. 1967).
149. See id. at 437.
150. See Youngman v. Shular, 155 Tex. 437, 288 S.W.2d 495 (1956).
151. See Riley, 972 S.W.2d at 155.
152. See id. at 155-56. In the far less complicated determination of the extent of a
homestead as a consequence of abandonment of occupancy, the question is merely one of
fact. See Scott v. Estate of Scott, 973 S.W.2d 694, (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.). The
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The issue before the court in Brooks v. Norris153 was the right of occupancy of a homestead by an adult unmarried child of a deceased homeowner. The adult child sought to stay in his late mother's home in order
to preclude sale of the home to discharge a judgment debt against his
mother. The claimant's right rested on his being a surviving dependent
constituent of his mother's family. The son showed that prior to his
mother's death he had lived in his mother's house and had shared expenses with her, but as an employed adult he was not dependent on her
for support. 154 Nor was the decedent subject to any legal or moral obligation to support this adult child. Hence, the adult son was not a surviving
family constituent entitled to protection under the Texas Constitution or
155
Probate Code section 270.
Sanchez v. Telles 156 was a land-title dispute between two claimants
from the same source, and the court granted summary judgment to the
claimant in the senior chain of title. The owner of the property had conveyed the property to the senior claimant as security for a loan with a
recital, supported by the grantor's affidavit, that the property was not the
grantor's homestead. The grantor's properly empowered agent then conveyed the same property to the junior claimant who was aware of the
prior conveyance. After the senior claimant had foreclosed his lien
against the grantor for non-payment of the loan, the junior grantee asserted his title. The basis for his claim was that the senior claimant's title
was absolutely void because the property was the grantor's homestead at
the time of the conveyance to the senior claimant. On behalf of the grantor, however, no claim was asserted that the property had been her homestead, 157 though the grantor had lived on the property with her daughter
(who acted as her agent in conveying the property to the junior claimant)
for at least two years prior to the first conveyance. The only summary
judgment proof offered by either party relevant to the homestead claim
was the grantor's sworn statement that the property was not her homerelevance of the inquiry in Scott was rather cloudy. A widow asserted that certain residential property had been erroneously characterized by the probate court as community property of her and her late husband, and she argued on appeal that the property was her
separate property and that her husband had abandoned his homestead interest in it during
marriage. The appellate court rejected her argument as to characterization as well as to
homestead abandonment. But even if the property had been abandoned by the decedent
as his homestead, his community interest would not have been affected. On the other
hand, if the property had been the widow's separate property, his abandonment of his wife
could have constituted abandonment of the homestead. See Earle's Executors v. Earle, 9
Tex. 630 (1853). His estate's interest in claiming the homestead as such presumably arose
from an effort to rebut the widow's claim that the decedent had abandoned his homestead
interest. The point of the widow's claim is nevertheless not apparent.
153. No. 05-95-01807-CV, 1997 WL 695588 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 7, 1997).
154. See id. at *1.Cf.Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Burgess, 155 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco, 1941, writ refd).
155. See id. at *3 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (as amended) and TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 270 (Vernon 1980)).
156. 960 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.).
157. There does not seem to have been any counter-assertion that the junior claimant's
title suffered from a similar flaw.
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stead, and as an affidavit that statement was prima facie evidence of its
truth. Moreover, the senior claimant had evidently shown at the trial that
the grantor had never claimed that the property was her homestead for
ad valorem tax purposes. 158 Though the senior claimant had not undertaken to show that the grantor claimed other property as her homestead,
and the junior claimant had not shown that she had no other homestead,
the appellate court found that the grantor's denial of her homestead
claim under oath was sufficient to sustain the trial court's rendition of
summary judgment in favor of the senior claimant. 159 The appellate court
also relied on the provision in the Texas Constitution that the grantee is
entitled to rely on the grantor's sworn assertion that the property is not
her homestead, though that provision had not found a place in the Con160
stitution until after the conveyance was made.
By way of contrast to the El Paso court's conclusion in Sanchez, a
bankruptcy court for the Western District of Texas held in In re Eskewl6 l
that sole possession by a remainderman as leasee of his own life-tenantgrantee can constitute a present homestead interest in the remainder as
well as the leasehold. There does not seem to have been any dispute that
the debtor's present leasehold interest in the property constituted part of
his homestead.162 The husband-bankrupt had been given the property by
his parents in 1972, had lived on the property until 1984, and had farmed
it continuously thereafter. In 1984 he had moved across the road but
continued to use the property as part of his rural homestead. In 1989 the
debtor and his wife granted a life-estate to the husband's parents to give
them (as the husband testified) "some security that they would always
have a say in the property. '163 The debtor, however, relinquished no
control over this property and continued to farm it subject to an oral
lease from the husband's parents. 164 In Eskew the debtor-claimants did
not seek to protect the husband's leasehold interest alone but also sought
to treat it as a means of tacking the leasehold interest to his reversionary
interest so that the reversion was also protected as exempt. As in In re

158. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.005 (Vernon 1997).

159. See Sanchez, 960 S.W.2d at .771.
160. See id. at 768-69 (citing TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50 (as amended)).
161. 233 B.R. 708 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998).
162. The court cited a dictum in In re Moody, 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 960 (1992), to the effect that the debtor who conveyed his homestead property to
a third person while retaining a life estate would not give up his present homestead interest. For a situation in which a seller in continued possession was held to have maintained
his homestead in property subsequent to its sale, see Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 43
(Tex. 1971). See also In re Nagel, 216 B. R. 397 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 51 SMU L. REV.
1047, 1064-65 (1998).
163. Eskew, 233 B.R. at 710.
164. In Eskew the debtor had disposed of the life-estate on which his homestead interest in the remainder depended.
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Nagel,16 5 the court relied on Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker,166 the
well-known instance in which the court held that a mobile home might be
claimed as an improvement to a homestead when moored to a mere
month-to-month leasehold interest in land. 167 Other authorities also support the proposition that a leasehold interest may constitute a homestead
interest. 68 For the further proposition that the present homestead interest of the debtors included their remainder interest, the court relied on
Evans v. Mills, 169 which did not support their contention. What the
claimants sought to show was a present merger of the prior fee to the
reversionary fee interest by way of the present leasehold interest. They
should have failed. The fee interest of the son prior to his conveyance of
the life-estate cannot be presently tacked to his reversionary interest in
fee by way of his present leasehold interest. Fee interests of steel (as they
are, as a matter of law) cannot be welded together with duct-tape (as a
mere leasehold interest is, as a matter of law). In Evans the grantors had
conveyed a right to minerals underlying their homestead but retained a
present royalty interest in the minerals, and their surface interest. Thus it
was said that the grantors retained a homestead interest in the reversion
to the minerals. The situation in Eskew was decidedly different in that
there was no present fee interest retained to which the remainder interest
could be united presently.
In McKee v. Smith 170 the court advanced another very dubious proposition: that real property owned by a debtor-wife, but leased to a corporation wholly owned by her debtor-husband, is exempt as her businesshomestead property. 17' Despite the ill-based authority of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re John Taylor Co.,172 real property used to
produce rents which may provide the entire sustenance of the family (as
the rents from the wife's realty did in this instance) does not constitute
homestead business property. 73 Contrary to the court's opinion, the
Supreme Court of Texas does not direct us "to construe the business
165. 216 B.R. 397 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997). For discussion of this case see Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 51 SMU L. REV.
1047, 1064-65 (1998).
166. 448 S.W. 2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
167. See id. at 832.
168. See, e.g., Johnston v. Martin, 81 Tex. 18, 21, 16 S.W. 550, 551 (1891) (not cited by
the court); Davis v. Lund, 41 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved);
Grimes v. McCrary, 211 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1948, no writ); First Nat'l
Bank of Kaufman v. Dismukes, 241 S.W. 199, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1922, no
writ); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Olivarez, 29 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Nagel, 216
B.R. 397 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
169. 67 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1934).
170. 965 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
171. See id. at 53.
172. 935 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1991). Full treatment of this case discussed in Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1831,
1849-50 (1992).
173. See, e.g., Autry v. Reasor, 102 Tex. 123, 128, 113 S.W. 748, 748 (1908); Blum v.
Rogers, 78 Tex. 530, 535, 15 S.W. 115, 117 (1890); Texas Commerce Bank-Irving v. MC
Creary, 677 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ); Yates v. Home Bldg. &
Loan Co., 103 S.W.2d 1081, 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ).
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homestead exemption liberally toward these ends. ' 174 Moreover, an individual cannot claim personalty as exempt (though its kind is defined by
statute as exempt to an individual 175) if it is sold to or leased by that
individual's wholly-owned corporation. 176
In another instance, rather than appealing from an unfavorable judgment of a Texas trial court, the judgment debtor invoked the protection
of the bankruptcy court by filing under Chapter 7. Three decisions later,
the results are related in In re Reitnauer.177 The Texas Attorney General
had brought suit on behalf of a charitable foundation established some
years before by the debtor to provide a sanctuary for abandoned and
neglected large felines such as lions, tigers, and leopards. On the petitioner's showing of a breach of trust on the part of the respondent, who
had created the charitable foundation, the Texas court imposed a large
award of damages and divested her of certain realty including her homestead right in the property that she had evidently shared with the foundation. In response to the foundation's motion in the bankruptcy
proceeding, the court lifted the automatic stay against enforcement of the
foundation's judgment. In ruling on an appeal from the bankruptcy
court, the federal district court reversed the bankruptcy court on the
ground that the Texas court lacked the power to deprive the judgment
debtor of her homestead rights.' 78 While recognizing that "Texas law
does not recognize that homestead rights can be lost ... for ... reasons"
given by the Texas court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless
reinstated the judgment of the bankruptcy court.1 79 The Fifth Circuit
court relied on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 80 in concluding that the
bankruptcy court had overstepped its jurisdictional powers in purporting
to review a state court's judgment. 181
Since 1934 the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has provided
mortgage insurance to homeowners for the benefit of lenders to cover
certain unpaid home mortgage loans in order to encourage home-building and buying of family homes. After World War II and the Korean
War, the Veterans Administration provided a similar program for eligible
veteran-buyers of homes. From 1957 private mortgage insurance has also
174. McKee, 965 S.W.2d at 53, citing Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43,53,35 S.W.2d 673,
678 (1931); Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 19 S.W.2d 35 (1929). Neither
authority supports that proposition.
175. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon 1994).
176. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 128 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
177. 152 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'g In re Reitnauer, 223 B.R. 913 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
178. See In re Reitnauer, 223 B.R. 913, 916 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
179. Reitnauer, 152 F.3d at 344 (quoting In re Reitnauer, 223 B.R. at 916). A homestead claimant may, of course, lose his homestead as a consequence of losing the property
in which the homestead is maintained. A common instance is that of foreclosure of a
purchase-money mortgage placed on realty prior to its being designated as the owner's
homestead.
180. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923) (federal district courts'
jurisdiction is strictly original); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 476 (1983) (final state courts' judgments are not reversible by federal district courts).
181. See Reitnauer, 152 F.3d at 343-44.
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been available to cover a specified part of the highest percentage of the
balance of home mortgage loans. Such mortgage insurance commonly
182
covers foreclosures of the upper twenty percent of the loan amount.
Once a home mortgage loan has been reduced to a balance of less than
eighty percent of the property's value, there is little need for the insurance. Hence, in the case of FHA and private mortgage insurance, if the
lender will allow borrowers to cancel the insurance at that time, the borrower's subsequent costs will be significantly reduced. Many lenders,
however, have not been careful to bring this fact to the attention of borrowers. On July 29, 1998, the President signed the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998,183 which requires automatic cancellation and notice of
cancellation rights for private mortgage insurance. 84
D.

PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS

Probate Code section 278 provides that on settlement of a solvent estate of a decedent exempt property (as defined in Property Code section
42.002185), apart from the homestead or an allowance in lieu of homestead, is "subject to partition and distribution among the heirs and distributees" of the estate. 18 6 Following the decision of the San Antonio
Court of Appeals in Kelley v. Shields,187 the Tyler Court of Appeals rejected the widow's argument of entitlement to title to such property of a
solvent decedent. 188 The court pointed out, however, that section 279 of
the Probate Code 189 provides that with respect to insolvent estates the
surviving spouse takes title to such property and allowances set apart to
the surviving spouse.1 90 Otherwise, the surviving spouse's use and benefit
of exempt personalty lasts only during the period of administration.
With respect to the rights of creditors, exempt personalty as defined in
the Property Code section 42.002 produces far more frequent disputes.
In In re Crockett' 9 1 spouses in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy asserted that a
wave runner or jet ski (a small vehicle similar to a motorcycle designed
for play in the surf) is exempt as "athletic and sporting equipment" within
the Texas statute. 192 In weighing this argument against prior authorities 93 dealing with Texas aquatic sporting equipment and the decision of
182. See

GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL

973-88 (1992).
183. Pub. L. 105-216, 112 Stat. 897 (1998).
184. See id. § 3.
185. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
186. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 278 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
187. 448 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref d n.r.e.).
188. See Bolton v. Bolton, 977 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.).
189. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 279.
190. See Bolton, 977 S.W.2d at 159.
191. 158 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1998).
192. Id. at 334 (referring to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(8)).
193. See In re Griffin, 139 B.R. 415,417 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (a Hobie sailboat); In
re Peyton, 73 B.R. 31 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) (dictum excluding a boat from the category
of exempt property generally); In re Gibson, 69 B.R. 534, 535 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987 (a
1968 Rivers boat); and In re Cypert, 68 B.R. 449 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (a glass Par
ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT
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the bankruptcy and district courts that this exemption should be limited
to "small items for individual use," the Fifth Circuit court construed the
language of section 42.002(a)(8) 194 on exempt sporting equipment by
comparing it to that of section 42.002(a)(4) 19 5 dealing with exempt tools
of trade. The mention only of "bicycles" in the former and of "boats and
motor vehicles" in the latter indicated to the court that
[t]he Texas legislature was obviously aware of the potential ambiguities surrounding the word 'equipment' with regard to boats and motor vehicles . . . [and] acted to include those items as 'equipment'
where it felt such inclusion was appropriate. The fact that [s]ection
42.002(a)(8) does not include boats and motor vehicles as examples
of 'equipment' leads us to conclude that the Texas legislature made a
conscious choice to omit such items 196
from subsection (a)(8)'s athletic
and sporting equipment exemption.
Thus, the appellate court sustained the conclusion of the lower courts that
the debtors' wave runner was not exempt sporting equipment under
Texas law. 197 It does not seem to have occurred to the court that the
legislature and its draftsman thought that all sporting equipment (a new
category of Texas exempt property) should be treated as exempt and
hence no clarifying language was necessary. 198
In In re Alexander19 9 the bankruptcy court allowed a debtor-couple to
claim as exempt the long-term payment of damages for the wrongful
death of their two minor children in the form of a structured settlement
annuity in reliance on article 21.22 of the Insurance Code. 200 In light of
the fact that the Texas statute exempts an "annuity ' 20 without any restriction as to the source of funds used to purchase the annuity or the
underlying purpose of the annuity, the court simply relied on the literal
language of the act and Texas's liberal exemption policy. 20 2
In Leibman v. Grand20 3 the provisions of section 42.002(a)(4) were at
issue in relation to enforcement of a turnover order against an ex-husband who had failed to satisfy a money judgment perhaps related to divifishing boat). The last was excluded on the ground that the boat was not "reasonably
necessary" as the statute then provided, as did the court in Hickey v. Couchman, 797
S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
194. "[A]thletic or sporting equipment, including bicycles."
195. "[TJools, equipment, books, and apparatus, including boats and motor vehicles
used in a trade or profession."
196. Crockett, 158 F.3d at 334-35.
197. See id. at 335.
198. The clarifying language with respect to boats and motor vehicles as tools of trade
was included for two reasons: (1) as to boats, because ferry boats had previously been
specifically exempted; and, (2) as to motor vehicles, because their treatment as tools of
trade had sometimes raised problems of exempt characterization. See the summary of the
draftsman's commentary on the 1991 amendments to the personal property exemption
statute in STATE BAR [OF TEXAS] SECTION REPORT, FAMILY LAW 41 (Summer 1991).
199. 227 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).

200.

TEX. INS. CODE ANN.

art. 21.22 (Vernon Supp. 1999).

201. Id.
202. See Alexander, 227 B.R. at 661.
203. 981 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).
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sion of property and for delinquent alimony awarded another by a North
Carolina divorce court. The ex-wife sought turnover of annuity funds in
which the ex-husband had invested by liquidation of allegedly non-exempt separate assets of the ex-husband. The annuity funds were admittedly exempt from seizure under article 21.22 of the Texas Insurance
Code, 20 4 unless those funds arose from non-exempt funds invested in the
annuity with intent to defraud his ex-wife under Business and Commerce
Code section 24.005.215 The funds invested in the annuity were traced to
proceeds of sale of a sailboat and an automobile. It was evidently not
argued that the sailboat was exempt as sporting equipment under Property Code section 42.002(a)(8). Rather, the ex-husband attempted to
bring it within section 42.002(a)(4). The appellate court held that he had
failed to show that the sailboat "fairly belonged to or was usable in the
debtor's trade and that it was used with sufficient regularity to indicate
actual use by the debtor. ' 211 6 The debtor (a practicing electrical engineer)
asserted that the boat was a tool of his trade as a sailing instructor, as he
had given sailing lessons in the boat to a co-worker, who lived for a while
on the boat (and paid rent) and had compensated the ex-husband for
sailing lessons by helping the debtor set up a computer. The debtor later
sold the boat but had apparently not given sailing lessons to others nor
was he purporting to practice that calling at the time he sold the boat. In
the meantime, however, the debtor asserted that he had used the boat in
his employment by entertaining potential clients on the boat three or four
times. The El Paso court, nevertheless, "fail[ed] to perceive in general
how a sailboat could be legitimately used in the trade or profession of an
20 7
electrical engineer.
Other funds traced to purchase the annuity fund came from the sale of
an automobile used by the debtor's wife within the terms of Property
Code section 42.002(a)(9).20 8 Before investing the proceeds of sale of the
car in the annuity fund, however, the debtor held these proceeds for several months and purchased a replacement vehicle with other funds. Thus,
the court said, to treat the proceeds as exempt funds would amount to
allowing the debtor "an exemption not only for his two automobiles but
also for the funds realized from the sale of a third vehicle. 2 0° 9 Although
there were some clearly exempt funds (borrowings from an exempt qualified retirement fund 2 0) that might have found their way into the annuity
investment, there were ample non-exempt funds that went into the fund
204. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22.
205. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 24.005 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
206. Leibman, 981 S.W.2d at 434 (citing In re Erwin, 199 B.R. 628, 630 (Bankr. S.D.

Tex. 1996)).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 434-35 (referring to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(9) (Vernon
Supp. 1999)). An authority for the exempt quality of the proceeds for destruction of exempt personalty is Sorenson v. City National Bank, 121 Tex. 478, 484-85, 49 S.W.2d 718,
721 (1932).
209. Leibman, 981 S.W.2d at 435.
210. See id. at 436 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999)).
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to purchase the annuity, which was therefore found to be non-exempt
2u
from the turnover order. 1
In dealing with proof of the exempt character of an individual retirement annuity (IRA) under Property Code section 42.0021(a) 2 12 in
Lozano v. Lozano,213 the majority of the Houston Fourteenth Appellate
District Court held that by the plain meaning of the statute "showing that
an account is an individual retirement annuity is sufficient to establish
that it is exempt unless evidence is presented that the IRA does not qualify for such treatment under the IRC. '' 214 One judge dissented on the
ground that the burden of proof in this regard should, nevertheless, fall
215
on the debtor.
IV.

DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A.

DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

1. Jurisdiction
a.

Durational Residence

Stating that his parents' residence in Tarrant County was his "permanent address," the husband in Roa v. Roa21 6 petitioned for divorce in

Tarrant County. The evidence of his residence there for ninety days preceding the filing of his petition is not summarized but was characterized
by the court as "extremely weak" 217 and appears to have been addressed
more to domicile than to residence. After their marriage in Bexar
County the couple had made their home in Hidalgo County and later in
Mexico City for over six years, though they had kept their house in Hidalgo County. The husband admitted that he had not lived in Tarrant
County since his marriage, and his wife had never lived there. He had,
nevertheless, registered to vote (but had not voted) in Tarrant County
and had received his driver's license there. Some bills incurred by his
wife had also been sent to his parents' address in Tarrant County. The
appellate court used the abuse of discertion standard in review of the trial
court's finding of the husband's residence in Tarrant County. 218 Because
there was said to be some evidence to support the trial court's finding, an
abuse of its discretion was not found.
211. See id.
212. TEX. PROP.

CODE ANN. §

42.0021(a).

213. 975 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
214. Id. at 67 (rejecting the authority of Rucker v. Rucker, 810 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied)). See Katherine C. Hall, Retirement Bene-

fits: Texas Property Code Amendment, 50 TEX. B.J. 993 (1987) (to the effect that putting
the burden of proof in this instance on the judgment creditor is consistent with the inequities section 42.0021 was intended to address).
215. See Lozano, 975 S.W.2d at 70 (Yates, J., dissenting, in reliance on Rucker v.
Rucker, 810 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 1991, writ denied)).
216. 970 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
217. Id. at 165.
218. See id. at 165 (citing Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1973, writ dism'd)).
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Probate Court's Power to Grant a Divorce Concerning an
Incompetent

In In re Graham2 1 9 the Texas Supreme Court held that with its expanded jurisdiction a probate court might transfer a divorce case to itself
for disposition.22 0 Since 1987 exclusive jurisdiction in divorce cases has
not vested in the district court.22 1 Indeed, before that time the legislature
had vested divorce jurisdiction in a number of county courts. 22 2 In this
instance the wife had brought suit for divorce against her husband, an
incompetent whose estate was subject to the jurisdiction of the probate
court. The case involved the characterization of particular assets as separate or community property of the incompetent and claims for reimbursement owed by the incompetent's separate estate to the community estate
and by the community estate to the wife's separate estate, as well as the
right of the wife to sole control of community property, the duty of the
husband's separate estate to pay certain attorney's fees, and the ultimate
division of the community estate.
2.

Waiver of Citation

Defee v. Defee2 2 3 was a bill of review case in which it was asserted by
the wife that a decree of divorce entered over seven years before was
void because her waiver of citation had not been on file prior to the entry
of the decree. The wife's attorney had discovered the executed waiver in
the file after the wife's petition for a bill of review was filed. The trial
judge, however, accepted as true the husband's testimony that, though
the waiver had not been filed before the trial of the divorce case, at the
trial the husband's attorney handed the waiver to the divorce judge who
accepted it and placed it in the file.22 4 Thus, the whereabouts of the
waiver was accounted for, and the validity of the divorce was not affected
by its not being stamped by the clerk.2 2 5
3. Judge's Recusal
In Lueg v. Lueg,226 as one of her grounds for appeal from a decree of
divorce, the wife complained of the judge's denial of her motion for
recusal. She argued that the judge's long-term friendship with one of her
husband's counsel, the judge's prior reliance on that lawyer as his campaign manager, and the lawyer's present representation of the judge in a
civil dispute raised a question of the judge's impartiality. Applying the
abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court concluded that though
219. 971 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1998).
220. See id. at 59-60 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 607-608) (as amended 1985).
221. See id. at 58-59.
222. The Texas Government Code offers examples, e.g. various county courts with jurisdiction to grant divorces.
223. 966 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
224. See id. at 721.
225. See id.
226. 976 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
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the attorney-client relationship between the judge and the attorney was a
prima facie basis for recusal, there was no showing that recusal was required. 227 Nor was there anything in the verdict to indicate that the political association of the judge and attorney had made recusal necessary. 22 8
4. Failure to Respond to Request for Admissions
Though In re Herring 2 9 was not a divorce case, its subject matter is
very closely related to the disposition of property elements of a divorce
case. A widowed husband had sued the administratrix of his late wife's
estate and his wife's son for community funds transferred to the son. In
moving for summary judgment on the pleadings, the defendants relied on
deemed admissions of facts as a result of the plaintiff's failure to respond
to requests for admissions. Such deemed admissions are competent summary judgment evidence. 2 30 Requests for admissions had been properly
submitted to the plaintiff, and he had responded to them within the
proper time but had failed to sign them as required by Rule 169.231 The
defendants therefore argued that the unsigned responses amounted to a
failure to respond. 2 32 Acknowledging a temptation to draw an analogy
between unsigned pleadings generally and an unsigned response to a request for admissions, the appellate court followed the authorities on Rule
169 that treat the signature to the response as not a mere formality but as
a substantive requirement of the response: 233 an "indication that the responding party has adopted and stands behind the answers he has provided in the same manner and with the same general consequences as the
prior requirement for verification of the answers. '234 Although the court
refused to consider broad requests that amounted to the plaintiff's admission of his lack of a cause of action, unsigned responses to specific requests concerning knowledge of transfers at particular times were treated
as admitted. Thus, summary judgment, denying some of the plaintiff's
235
case, was sustained.
5. Proof of Grounds for Divorce
In Roa v. Roa,2 36 the court was careful to note that the parties' characterization of the judgment of divorce as a default judgment (because it
was granted in the absence of a party) was inaccurate in that "the petitioner is required to prove the allegations at the final hearing on the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See id. at 311.
See id.
970 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
See id. at 587.
TEX. R. Crv. P. 169.
See Herring, 970 S.W.2d at 588.
See id. at 588-89.
Id. at 589.
See id. at 589-90.
970 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
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case. '237 Therefore, the petitioner's burden of proof was not affected by
the respondent's failure to appear.
6. Interim Attorney's Fees
While her petition for divorce was pending a final hearing, the wife in
In re Bryce238 moved the court to award interim fees for her attorney.
The court ordered that the husband pay a specific amount, and after the
husband failed to pay, the court made an order to the husband in writing
to pay half the specified amount on the following day. After the husband
again failed to pay, the wife sought enforcement by contempt. When the
wife called the husband as a witness at the contempt hearing, he asserted
his right against self-incrimination and refused to testify. After the wife
had put on her case, the husband's counsel sought to put on his defense,
but the judge precluded him from doing so and explained that the husband's counsel had already kept his client from testifying as to his ability
to pay. The judge thereupon cited the husband for contempt and ordered
him to jail until he paid the amount due under the order. The husband
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. In granting the writ the court held
in Bryce that the contemnor was entitled to be heard in his own defense
2 39
as a matter of due process if he had not knowingly waived that right.
In this instance, the court said, the tenor of the questions put by the husband's counsel to the wife's witness indicated that the husband would
240
testify as to his inability to pay.
7.

Unappealable Interlocutory Orders

Though section 51.014(a)(1) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code
provides for an interlocutory appeal of the appointment of a receiver, an
order for the appointment of a successor receiver is not an appealable
241
interlocutory order.
8. Costs
Walston v. Walston 242 dealt with an appeal from a trial on remand after
a prior appeal of a divorce case. In the prior appeal, the ex-husband was
ordered to pay the costs of that appeal and the ex-wife complained in her
second appeal that on remand the trial court had failed to order payment
237. Id. at 164 (citing Mason v. Mason, 282 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1955, no writ (Thomas, C.J., concurring)). See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary to the
Texas Family Code, Title 1, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 911, 988 (1990).
238. 981 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
239. See id. at 888.
240. See id.
241. See Swate v. Johnston, 981 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
no pet.) (citing, inter alia, First Nat'l Bank of Gilmer v. First State Bank of Hawkins, 456
S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, writ dism'd); Benningfield v. Benningfield, 155 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1941, no writ); MuFarlane v.
Greenameyer, 199 S.W. 304, 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1917, no writ)); and Scalfani
v. Scalfani, 870 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
242. 971 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, no pet.).
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of those costs. In responding to this point, the court in Walston stated
that in civil cases the party against whom costs are assessed must pay the
costs of appeal including the costs for preparation of the clerk's record
and the reporter's record. 24 3 Thus, because on the first appeal the court
had ordered the ex-husband to pay the costs of appeal, it is not necessary
for the trial court to reorder payment though it is the trial court's duty to
enforce the appellate court's order which can be achieved by a writ of
execution. 244 If the claimant fails to present her claim for costs to the
trial court, she has failed to preserve any claim for appellate review. 245
On second remand to the trial court, however, she may still obtain a writ
of execution pursuant to the earlier order of the appellate court. 246
9.

Court's Retention of Plenary Power

In the course of considering a petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate
an order granting a new trial, the Texas Supreme Court in In re Dickason2 47 reviewed some aspects of the limits of the trial court's exertion of
its plenary power. The husband-plaintiff had apparently sued his wife for
divorce and also sued her alleged paramour for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in having an affair with his wife. After the man's second effort to protect himself from the plaintiff's deposition subpoena,
both parties moved for sanctions against each other. The husband's motion was overruled. As part of its sanction against the husband, the court
dismissed his suit against the alleged paramour with prejudice on November 25. The plaintiff then filed a timely motion for a new trial on December 19 followed by an amended motion on December 26. The judge, who
was leaving the bench at the end of the year, overruled the plaintiff's
motion on December 27. After the successor judge was recused, an assigned judge then granted the plaintiff's amended motion on February 10.
The defendant then filed his petition for mandamus to vacate that order.
In granting the writ, the Texas Supreme Court explained in its per
curiam opinion that the plaintiff had filed his motion for new trial on
December 19, within thirty days of the November 25 order, and the trial
court therefore had plenary power to act on that motion for seventy-five
days from November 25 under Rule 329b(c). 248 After the court overruled that motion on December 27, the court retained its plenary power
to alter its order for another thirty days under Rule 329b(e). 249 Thus, the
243. See Walston, 971 S.W.2d at 697 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 43.4). Costs for a transcript
on appeal are taxable costs. For what costs are taxable and those that are non-taxable, see

Brad A. Allen & John D. Ellis, Jr., What are Taxable Court Costs in Texas? HOUSTON
LAWYER, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 14.
244. See id. (citing TEX. R. App. P. 51.1(b)). See also City of Garland v. Long, 722
S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Varner v. Koons, 888 S.W.2d 511, 513
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ).
245. See Walston, 971 S.W.2d at 698 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 33.1).
246. See id. (citing City of Garland, 722 S.W.2d at 51).
247. No. 98-0140, 1998 WL 716936 (Tex. Oct. 15, 1998).
248. See id. at *1 (citing TEX. R. Crv. P. 329b(c)).
249. See id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e)).
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court's plenary power was exhausted on January 26 and the order of February 10 was void.
10.

Timely Appeal: Effect of Request for Findings

A related dispute arose in the Pursley v. Ussery,25° involving an exwife's bill of review proceeding to set aside a 1992 divorce. The judge
indicated on May 5, 1997, that he would grant the bill. After the exhusband filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
judge conducted a new hearing on May 17 and thereafter signed the interlocutory order granting the bill, setting aside the 1992 order, and reserving judgment on a re-division of property. Although there seems to
have been some dispute as to if, or when, the judge recused himself, on
July 31 another judge conducted a further trial and divided the property.
His order was signed on September 4, and the ex-husband appealed on
December 3. The ex-wife thereupon asserted that the appeal was not
filed on time and should be dismissed. The dispute turned on the effect
of the husband's motion for findings of law and fact. The San Antonio
Court of Appeals held that, in light of the subsequent judgment of July
31, the husband's motion of May 14 was treated as premature and untimely and thus filed on July 31; therefore, the time for appeal had run on
51
October 29.2
11. Appeal: Complete Record
a.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A lack of clear findings with respect to the character and value of particular items of matrimonial property may make meaningful review of the
trial court's division of that property impossible. When such findings are
properly requested, the court must supply them. 2 52 Because this duty is
mandatory, the failure of the trial court to respond to such a timely request is presumed harmful unless the appellate record affirmatively
shows that the complaining party has suffered no injury.253 When such
findings are not requested, the appellate court presumes that the trial
court made all necessary findings to support its judgment, 254 and in determining whether some evidence supports the judgment, the appellate
court considers only that evidence most favorable to the judgment and
disregards all contrary evidence.2 55 In Frommer v. Frommer 56 the Hous250. 982 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
251. See id. at 600.
252. See In re Combs, 958 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.) (citing
TEX. R. Civ. P. 297).
253. See id. (citing Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. 1989)).
254. See Frommer v. Frommer, 981 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
no pet.) (citing Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); Roberson v. Roberson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989); Magill v. Magill, 816 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. App.Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
255. See Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109.
256. 981 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)
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ton First Court of Appeals concluded that findings recited in a judgment
cannot be relied upon because Rule 299a precludes such findings. 257 In
Frommer no findings were requested, and in aid of his case on appeal the
appellant sought to rely on recitals of characterization of property in the
judgment. His argument was rejected along with his reliance on
the re258
cent decision of the Amarillo Court of Appeals in Hill v. Hill.
In Hill conclusions of law were requested as to characterization of certain items of property and the court responded by referring the appellant
to recitals in the judgment in that respect. The appellee asserted that the
appellant was nonetheless precluded by Rule 299a from relying on those
recitals and that the appellant should have pressed her request for "additional findings" in that regard. 259 The appellate court held, however, that
at trial the appellee had not complained of error and that the language 26of
the judgment did not conflict with the court's formal findings of fact. 0
The court added that to rule otherwise would render meaningless that
part of Rule 299a, which dictates how conflicts between findings are to be
resolved. In Frommer the court found the situation in Hill distinguishable from that in Frommer but did not comment on the Amarillo court's
261
reasoning.
Clearly some legislative or rule-making attention to this situation is required, but in making amends a balance must be struck between requiring needed particularized findings and a requirement of findings that will
be unduly burdensome on the trial court.2 62 In Hill, for example, the wife
requested the net values of almost fifty items of personal property and
also asked what percentage of the net community estate should be received by each party in order to achieve a "just and right" division. The
court responded to the latter question only and indicated that each party
should receive about fifty percent of the net community estate. 263 On
appeal the wife asserted that the trial court was obligated to respond to
the former request so that she could determine whether she received fifty
percent of the community estate. The Amarillo court first pointed out
that only findings and conclusions on ultimate or controlling issues need
be made. "[I1n matters of property division, the ultimate or controlling
issue is whether the division was just and right. The value of the property
being divided, though related to the ultimate issue, is not a controlling
issue."'2 64 Further, as to the wife's request for findings of the values of
particular pieces of property, these were "findings upon evidentiary, as
257. See id. at 814.
258. See id. at 813. See also Hill v. Hill, 971 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no
pet.).
259. See Hill, 971 S.W.2d at 157.
260. See id.
261. See Frommer, 981 S.W.2d at 813.
262. Proposals for legislation have been drafted for enactment at 1999 regular legislative sessions.
263. See Hill, 971 S.W.2d at 155.
264. Id. (citing Rafferty v. Finstad, 903 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, writ denied)).
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opposed to ultimate or controlling issues. ' 265 Thus, the court had not
erred in refusing to make such findings in that instance. But the difference of opinion as to how far a court should go in making findings of fact
varies considerably, as Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Rafferty
v. Finstad266 indicates.

b.

Bad Quality of Audio Transcription

In the course of the proceedings and at the trial of the divorce from
which an appeal was taken in Richardson v. Richardson,267 the wife's inventory was not produced at trial and her attorney was therefore precluded from attempting to trace her separate assets. That fact did not
constitute the basis for her appeal, however, but may have influenced the
majority of the court in overruling the wife's sole point of error with respect to the completeness of the record before the court. The basis for
the wife's appeal was the skeletal state of the record. At a point well into
the trial, the court reporter's stenographic machine began to function erratically, causing gaps in the testimony transcribed. The stenographer evidently did not know shorthand, and the machine was abandoned in favor
of a tape-recording machine, which neither counsel apparently checked
for operability. The result was a very poor quality of tape transcription
that reproduced parts of the testimony without the questions of counsel.
After four motions for extensions of time to prepare a statement of facts
268
the wife moved for abatement of the appeal and sought a new trial.
Appellate Rule 50(e) states that a new trial shall be granted if "the court
reporter's notes and records have been lost or destroyed ...

unless the

parties agree on a statement of facts."'269 The majority of the court construed the rule to mean that the "testimony was actually memorialized by
some method and that the existing memorialized testimony was either
lost or destroyed. ' 270 The majority concluded that the standard of the
rule had not been met and that counsel had failed in exercising proper
diligence to assure the preparation of a record of the trial. 27 1 Relying on
Gillen v. Williams Brothers Construction Co.,272 Justice Stover dissented
on the ground that the wife, through her counsel, was sufficiently diligent
in protecting the record and was therefore entitled to a new trial. 273
265. Id.
266. See id. at 378 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of this case see Joseph
W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L.
REV.

1015, 1049 (1996).

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

969 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.).
See id. at 536.
TEX. R. APP. P. 50(e).
Richardson, 969 S.W.2d at 536.
See id.
933 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
See Richardson, 969 S.W.2d at 537 (Stover, J., dissenting).
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Estoppel to Appeal

As a corollary to the principle of estoppel, a litigant cannot accept the
benefits of a decree of divorce voluntarily and afterwards prosecute an
appeal from the divorce. 274 But if the grounds for appeal are unrelated to
the benefits accepted (for example, acceptance of benefits of property
division and appealing matters of child custody and child support), the
appellant is not estopped, 275 nor is the appellant estopped if the ground
for appeal is based on fraud or misrepresentation of the other spouse
2 76
affecting a property division.
In In re Richards277 the divorce court had granted the divorce and divided the community property according to the agreement of the parties;
there was no property divided in favor of one party that was in possession
of the other, nor was there any money judgment rendered by the court.
The court ordered that each party was responsible for his or her own
costs. The wife nevertheless filed notice of appeal. Asserting that the
wife was acting in bad faith, the husband thereupon sought an appeal
bond. The wife responded by asking for sanctions for a frivolous motion.
The trial court set a "cost bond" of $2000 and denied the motion for sanctions, and the wife appealed both rulings. The appellate court held that
there was nothing under the circumstances that the wife might seek in
execution or any other purpose for which an appeal bond might be
sought.2 78 As for the requested sanctions, the appellate court merely
pointed out that the trial court had made the order, and in view of that
79
fact, the imposition of sanctions would not be appropriate.2
13. Bill of Review
In Defee v. Defee2 80 the ex-husband asserted the four years statute of
limitation28 1 against a bill of review to a judgment of divorce. That statutory period begins to run at the date of the judgment unless the petitioner
can show extrinsic fraud. 282 The trial court, however, found ample evi2 83
dence to rebut a showing of extrinsic fraud.
B.

PROPERTY SETrLEMENT AGREEMENTS

Two recent cases turned on the interpretation of terms of property set274. See Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950).
275. See Roa v. Roa, 970 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (citing
Lipshy v. Lipshy, 525 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd)).
276. See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 713 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ
dism'd).
277. No. 07-98-0038-CV, 1998 WL 396424 (Tex. App.-Amarillo July 15, 1998).
278. See id. at *2 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 24).
279. See id. at *3.
280. 966 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
281. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1997).

282. See Defee, 966 S.W.2d at 722 (citing Law v. Law, 792 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
283. See id.
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tlement agreements in relation to their enforcement. In Allen v. Allen 284
the agreement provided that the husband's obligation to make monthly
support payments to his ex-wife would terminate if she should cohabitate
with another man. The evidence showed that subsequent to the divorce
the ex-wife had had sexual relations with two other men with whom she
was successively romantically attached for a period of time. In both cases
the men stayed intermittently at her house and kept some of their belongings there. The court supplied the ex-husband's definition of "cohabitate" to the jury: ". . . the term 'cohabitate' does not require living
together, claiming to be married, in the relationship of husband wife. It
can include an irregular, limited, or partial living together for the purpose
2 85
of sexual relations.
The jury denied recovery to the ex-wife in her suit for the ex-husband's
failure to make the agreed payments. In reversing the trial court's judgment, the appellate court held that under the circumstances no definition
was required to be submitted because the word "cohabitation" in its context was unambiguous and therefore did not require definition. 286 Thus,
by supplying a definition the trial court bound the jury to a specific meaning of the word rather than "what the jury would ordinarily understand
'287
the parties to mean.
In Cardwell v. Sicola-Cardwe1288 the dispute went beyond the actual
terms of the agreement. The court considered whether the obligation
survived the death of the obligor. The Austin Court of Appeals applied
the ordinary rule that a contractual obligation of a decedent is enforceable against his estate if the contract is capable of being performed by the
estate. 289 The agreement provided that the former husband would make
three hundred monthly payments to his former wife. The contract was
not for personal service of the obligor nor did its non-assignable provisions so suggest. The contract specifically provided that it terminated on
the former wife's death or the completion of the required number of payments. The appellate court construed the contract as unambiguous and
required the ex-husband's estate to pay the present value of the remain290
ing payments.
The third settlement agreement case is much more unusual: Rule 11
agreement entered into before judgment, filed with the court thereafter,
but before the judgment became final. In In re Raffaell 9 ' the wife had
filed suit for divorce and before judgment moved to Alabama. Though
the sequence of these events is not clear from the decision, following the
284. 966 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
285. Id. at 660.
286. See id. at 661.

287. Id.
288. 978 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
289. See id. at 725-26. See also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Beaird, 475 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd).
290. See Cardwell, 978 S.W.2d at 728.
291. 975 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied) (per curiam).
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divorce hearing the court sent a letter to counsel indicating the court's
division of property as well as custody and support of their minor children. Evidently mutually dissatisfied with the court's disposition of their
affairs, the couple entered into a written settlement agreement. The husband then moved the court to render judgment according to the agreement, but the court entered a judgment different from the terms set out in
the court's letter and the parties' agreement. With the settlement agreement attached to his pleading, and thus for the first time filed with the
court, the husband then brought a separate suit just before the divorce
became final to enforce the agreement as a contract. With that action
pending, the husband then appealed from denial of his motion in the suit
for divorce; he sought enforcement of the Rule 11 agreement or abatement of the appeal pending resolution of his proceeding on the contract.
The Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that the parties' agreement
had by its filing (though in another proceeding) complied with all the
requirements of an enforceable agreement under Rule 11: ". . . no agreement between ... parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the
record ... "292
The court did not inquire whether the agreement had been filed "with
the papers as part of the record" but gave effect to the agreement simply
as "filed while the trial court still had plenary power over its judgment
and before the judgment became final."'293 The fact that the wife had
withdrawn her consent to the agreement prior to its filing was of no aid to
her because she was already bound by her contract. 294 Nor could she rely
on the husband's alleged failure to make an agreed payment under the
contract within thirty days of signing (a fact that was in dispute) because
the agreement did not provide that time was of the essence, and the
agreement presupposed (as an agreement under Rule 11) that it would
become enforceable only on approval by the court. 295
C.

MAKING THE DIVISION ON DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

296

1. Process of Division
Although during the year past the appellate courts do not seem to have
been presented with many questions dealing with division of property on
divorce, some anxiety has nonetheless been expressed concerning the
ability of the Texas property system to handle the problems of divorce
292. Id. at 661 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 11).
293. Id. (emphasis supplied).
294. See id. at 662 (citing Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. 1995)).
295. See id. at 661.
296. In its 1997 revision, Subtitle C of Title 1 of the Family Code received a new title,
"Dissolution of Marriage" and Chapter 6 is called "Suit for Dissolution of Marriage."
Suits to declare a marriage void, suits for annulment, and suits for divorce are all covered
in Chapter 6. Subtitle C deals with inter vivos dissolution of marriage only. The other kind
(death) is covered in the Probate Code.
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adequately.2 97 Some have suggested solutions available in the principle
of post-divorce maintenance of ex-spouses and other alternatives. 298
Some courts were too quick in awarding ex-spousal maintenance in cases
brought prior to the effective date of the statute authorizing that remedy.29 9 In remanding the case for further proceedings in In re Combs, the
court noted the inextricable relationship between the process of property
division and award of maintenance. 30 0 Before Texas courts turn casually
to the alternative award of ex-spousal maintenance, they should carefully
consider the difficulties of enforcing maintenance awards in other states
whose experience with the remedy is far more extensive than ours.
While injury to business interests may be considered in making divisions of property on divorce, 30 1 it has also been suggested that careful
examination should be made in those instances of the seller's implied covenant not to derogate goodwill in relation to valuation of business interests. 302 Although abuses of discretion in making the division of property
are occasionally found, one senses that many appellate complaints in that
regard are made somewhat casually and without good cause. 30 3 In some
instances, however, even though the trial court may have made an error
constituting mischaracterization of property, disposition of a small
amount of property, properly characterized as community rather than
separate property, awarded to the separate owner of the related property
may not affect the just and right division of the community estate. 30 4 In
Butler v. Butler,3o5 however, the trial court had decided to award sixty
percent of the community estate to the wife and forty percent to the husband. In making its proportionate computation, however, the court failed
to consider a larger sum awarded to the community as reimbursement
from the husband's estate, the wife's attorney's fees, and what were called
equalizing monthly payments, all of which were also ordered paid by the
husband to the wife with the result that the wife was awarded about seventy-five percent of the community property and the husband, twentyfive percent. 30 6 On the husband's appeal, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals termed the result "manifestly unfair" and remanded the case for
297. See Bea Ann Smith, Why the Community Property System Fails Divorced Women

and Children, 7 TEX.

J. OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

135 (1998).

298. See James W. Paulsen, The History of Alimony in Texas and the New "Spousal
Maintenance" Statute, 7 TEX. J. OF WOMEN AND THE LAW 151 (1998); Martha M. Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital
Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 33-37 (1998).
299. See In re Combs, 958 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no pet.). See also
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 51
SMU L. REV. 1047, 1082-83 (1998).
300. See Combs, 958 S.W.2d at 849.
301. See Walston, 971 S.W.2d at 693.
302. See George P. Roach, The Seller's Implied Covenant Not to Derogate Goodwill,
1998 STATE BAR [OF TEXAS] SECTION REPORT (No. 3, Summer 1998).
303. See, e.g., Frommer, 981 S.W.2d at 814.
304. See Hunt v. Hunt, 952 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, no pet.).
305. 975 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
306. See id. at 770.
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re-division. 30 7
In Kimsey v. Kimsey 3°8 it was also asserted that the divorce court had
erred in making the division. Although the court did not disturb the trial
court's award of over sixty percent of the community estate (including
business interests) to the husband, he had also been ordered to pay very
substantial debts (apparently incurred for business purposes) 30 9 as well
discharging a separate debt for reimbursement at the rate of $1000 a
month over almost ten years. Speaking through Justice McClure, a leading judicial authority on Texas family law, the court also provided a set of
guidelines for trial courts in winding up the proprietary aspects of divorce. The court not only directed closer attention to spelling out the
mode of preparing both parties' federal income tax returns in instances
when their returns were in arrears 3 10 but also specified inclusion of disposition of tax refunds and preservation of financial records and the parties'
access to them. 311 The court there found that the trial court had abused
its discretion in not giving the wife a full choice of remedies by failing to
require the husband to execute a promissory note and deed of trust on
certain separate realty on which the court had perpetuated an equitable
lien 312 in favor of the community estate for the receipt of reimbursable
benefits rendered during marriage. 313 For the further benefit of both obligors and obligees the court also counseled that "[wihenever a party is to
make some payment after the date of divorce, the decree should specify
the dates, time, and location of the payment. '3 14 In like manner, an
award of corporate stock should specify the number of shares or a particular stock certificate. 3t 5 As security for reimbursement and an encouragement of its prompt payment, the court further specified that in order
to avoid ambiguity as to compound interest on a money judgment for
reimbursement, the divorce decree should specify "interest at the legal
'3 16
rate, compounded annually.
307. Id.
308. 965 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).
309. It is not indicated, however, whether the wife was personally obligated for any of
these debts. Whatever Justice Johnson may have meant beyond liability of jointly managed community property in using the phrase "joint community obligation" in Cockerham
v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 171 (Tex. 1975), allusion to the observation (as in Kimsey,
965 S.W.2d at 702) can only create confusion after the amendment of TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 3.201 (formerly § 4,031) and 3.202 (formerly § 5.61) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
310. See id. at 696.
311. See id.
312. Though it reflects casual professional usage, the court's comment on the perpetuation of an equitable lien for reimbursement is not as precise as it might be. See id. at 698.
Surely such a lien (judicially recognized) is a species of judgment lien and notice of its
existence is provided by abstracting the divorce judgment. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1831, 1866-67 (1992).
313. See Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d at 698.
314. Id. at 697.
315. See id. at 698.
316. Id. (citing TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 304.003, 304.006 (Vernon Supp. 1999)).

1186
2.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Terminology of Decree

Stanley v. Riney 317 dealt with the meaning of a decree of annulment.
The petitioner alleged that the only community property accumulated
during the marriage was personal effects and the court found that her
allegation was true and provided in the decree that each party take "all
such property as is presently in his or her possession. '3 18 At the time of
the decree the wife had in her possession an uncashed lottery ticket acquired during the marriage and worth approximately $4,300,000. The exhusband then sought and was granted a declaratory judgment that the
lottery ticket and its proceeds had not been divided. In rejecting the exwife's appeal the court pointed out that "[a] litigant cannot complain
about an action of the trial court that was done at the invitation of the
complaining party. ' 319 The court went on to say that the petitioner might
have requested that the court divide personal property but had chosen to
ask for division of personal effects only. 320 "Personal effects commonly
refer to items of personal property used or usable primarily by the person
to whom they are related, such as clothes, toilet articles, glasses, and den32 1
tures, and not to significant items of intangible personal property.
Further, the prior decree could not be res judicata to the ex-husband's
post-annulment proceeding because the division of assets other than personal effects was not put in issue in the prior proceeding. 322 In rejecting
the ex-wife's objection that the ex-husband had improperly brought his
suit in a court other than that which had granted the annulment, the appellate court pointed out that a suit for undivided community property is
properly brought under section 9.203 in a court other than that entering
the original decree. 323 The court noted that a suit for enforcement of a
decree is properly brought in the court making the original decree and
retaining jurisdiction to enforce it under section 9.002.324
3. Attorney's Fees
As a general rule the award of attorney's fees to either party in a suit
for divorce is an element of property division 32 5 but other factors may
also affect such awards. 326 Also as a general rule in marital or post-mari317. 970 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.) (opinion withdrawn from publication on motion by party).
318. Id. at 638.
319. Id. (citing Litton Indus. Prod., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 321-22 (Tex.
1984)).
320. See id. at 639.
321. Id. (citing Teaff v. Ritchey, 622 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981,
no writ); Dearman v. Dutschmann, 739 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987,
writ denied)).
322. See Stanley, 970 S.W.2d at 640.
323. See id. at 639; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.203 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
324. See id. at 639; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.002.

325. See Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950); Butler v. Butler, 975 S.W.2d 765, 770 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no writ).
326. As a necessaries contract, a contract for attorney's fees would also seem enforceable against the other party, especially when that party is the petitioner for divorce. It has
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tal disputes, attorney's fees are awarded to the prevailing party only 327
but that rule has its exception. One such exception is found in the situation when one party is successful on some points of appeal and is awarded
attorney's fees in that regard. 32 8 The Ethics Committee of the State Bar
of Texas has also concluded that it is improper in a divorce case for an
attorney to sue his own client for his fees. 329 In Kimsey v. Kimsey,330
there were pleadings for fees by each party against the other for attorney's fees but no pleadings by either attorney for fees against his own
client. The jury nevertheless rendered a verdict that each party should
pay his or her attorney's fees, and the court in turn awarded a money
judgment to each attorney for his client's fees. On appeal, the husband
asserted that the court might order each party to pay his or her attorney's
fees but acknowledged that a money judgment should not be awarded
against the wife in favor of her attorney. The wife's attorney evidently
made no response in this regard, and the appellate court held that the
award of the money judgment to the attorneys of both parties against
33 1
their clients was improper.
As to the quantum of attorney's fees, the Texas Supreme Court held in
Stuart v. Bayless 332 that in an action by a lawyer against his former client
for fees, lost contingent fees are not recoverable unless the parties contemplated at the time the contract was made that such damages would be
the probable result of breach. As a matter of law, the court went on to
say that such injury (lost fees as a result of having to bring suit for an
unpaid bill) is not ordinarily foreseeable in a divorce case. 33 3 Thus, if
such a loss is sought to be covered, it ought to be included in the attorney's fee contract.
D.

Ex-SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

Combs334

In In re
an impetuous trial court had awarded ex-spousal
maintenance in a suit for divorce filed before the statute authorizing an
award for such maintenance came into effect and proceeded to make a
also been said that a party should not be ordered to pay attorney's fees for the other when
the cost must fall on the payee's separate estate. See Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied), overruled on other grounds by
Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). But see Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d
835, 838 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ) (holding that such an argument is inappropriate in a dispute concerning the parent-child relationship).
327. See, e.g., Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998) (holding that because
the husband was successful in his appeal against a judgment in favor of his wife, the award
of attorney's fees in her favor was reversed).
328. See Carlson v. Carlson, 983 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no
pet.).
329. See Texas Ethics Committee Opinion No. 374, 37 TEX. B.J. 1085 (1974).
330. 965 S.W.2d at 690.
331. See id. at 694 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b) and Beavers v. Beavers, 675 S.W.2d
296, 300 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ). But see Texas Ethics Committee Opinion,
supra note 329.

332. 964 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
333. See id. at 922.
334. 958 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no pet.).
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division of the community estate. In putting aside the maintenance
award the court said that it was also obliged to set aside the property
division: A great many of the factors controlling the award of maintenance and the division of property are not only the same but the two
335 In Alexander v. Alexander,336
processes are "inextricably intertwined.
on the other hand, the Houston First Court of Appeals 337 defined some
of the standards for division in an award of spousal maintenance in limited circumstances 338 when there is very little property to divide on
divorce.
E.

POST DIVORCE DIVISION

In divorce cases from the forties through the mid-seventies, retirement
benefits were often overlooked in the division of property either because
those benefits were assumed to belong to the prospective pensioner as
separate property or because the pension interest was not yet vested. In
Busby v. Busby 3 3 9 the Texas Supreme Court held in 1970 that community
property undivided on divorce became a tenancy in common between the
34 1
34
former spouses subject to partition. ' In 1976, in Cearley v. Cearley,
the Texas Supreme Court held that unvested pension interests were nonetheless divisible. 342 With respect to military pensions, however, the
United States Supreme Court held, in McCarty v. MCCarty,343 on June 26,
1981, that those interests were not divisible under the Congressional Act.
Acting with considerable speed for such an unwieldy legislative body,
Congress thereupon enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses
Protection Act, 344 signed by the President on September 9, 1982 (to be
effective on February 1, 1983) to make such pension interests (payable
after June 25, 1981) divisible under state law. It seemed apparent to some
in light of the decision in MCCarty and its treatment by Congress that
pension rights arising before June 26, 1981, were therefore not subject to
division. The Supreme Court of Texas so held in 1982 in Cameron v.
Cameron,345 but uncertainty on the point lingered on until Congress provided that with respect to divorces rendered prior to June 26, 1981 partitions of benefits should not be allowed, but with respect to decrees
entered between June 25, 1981 and November 5, 1990 such divisions
335. See id. at 851.
336. 982 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
337. In its marquee, the cast of judges in the advance sheets not only includes Justices
O'Connor and Taft but also Justice Bea Ann Smith of the Austin court sitting by designation. In the footnote, however, Justice Smith is identified as Jackson B. Smith, Jr., a retired
judge of the First Court of Appeals.
338. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.002 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
339. 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970).
340. See id. at 554.
341. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
342. See id. at 662.
343. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
344. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1998).
345. 641 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1982).
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would end on November 5, 1990, the date of the amendment. 346 Application of that statute was before the San Antonio Court of Appeals in Mc
Dougall v. Havlen.347 The couple had married in 1953 while the husband
was a member of the Air Force and they were divorced in 1976 after his
retirement, but no division in the retirement benefits was made. In 1996
the ex-wife filed a petition for division of the ex-husband's military retirement pay as an undivided community asset. In reliance on the federal act
of 1990 the trial court granted the ex-husband's motion for summary
judgment and the ex-wife appealed. Relying on Buys v. Buys, 34 8 which
turned on an interpretation of a residuary clause in a property settlement
agreement deemed to include a pre-June 26, 1981 retirement interest, and
Walton v. Lee,349 in which the court put reliance on the effect of Texas law
in converting undivided community property into a tenancy in common,
the court concluded that the ex-wife's interest was not covered by the
federal statute of 1990.35 1 The court relied heavily on an article by Professor William Reppy 351 and distinguished the decision in Knowles v.
Knowles.352 The applicability of the 1990 federal statute to such cases as
Buys, Walton, and McDougall is nonetheless hard to refute. 353
In McDougall, the court also dealt with the ex-husband's assertion that
the two-years statute of limitation in section 9.003 bars such claims as that
asserted. 354 Section 9.004,355 however, provides that the prior section
does not apply to suits for partition of tenancies in common. 356 The court
also pointed out that the applicability of section 9.003 depends on a showing of unambiguous repudiation of the asserted claim which had not been
made, 357 and the ex-husband had not properly pled section 9.003 as a
defense to the ex-wife's entire cause of action but merely as a defense
regarding payments received by him prior to June 26, 1994. Finally, the
346. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
347. 980 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
348. 924 S.W.2d 369, 372-73 (Tex. 1996).
349. 888 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied).
350. See MCDougall, 980 S.W.2d at 770-71.
351. See William Reppy, Jr., The 1990 U.S.F.S.P.A. Amendments: No Bar to Recognition of Tenancy in Common Interests Createdby Pre-McCarty Divorcesthat Failed to Divide
Military Retirement Benefits, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 941, 961 (1992).
352. 811 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ), which interpreted an
agreed settlement as granting the entire pension interest to the military spouse. The court
in Knowles had also relied on the doctrine of res judicata and the 1990 federal act. See
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw.
L.J. 1831, 1864 (1992). On other applications of the doctrine of res judicata in this context
see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49
SMU L. REv. 1015, 1024-25 (1996).
353. As to Buys see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1189, 1229-30 (1997). As to Walton see Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV.
1225, 1235-36 (1995).
354. See MDougall, 980 S.W.2d at 771; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.003 (Vernon Supp.
1998).
355. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.004 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
356. See McDougall, 980 S.W.2d at 771.
357. See id.
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court rejected the ex-husband's defenses of laches and estoppel as not
358
supported by evidence to show his proper reliance on those defenses.
McLaurin v. McLaurin359 also dealt with an ex-husband's appeal from a
judgment in favor of his ex-wife to enforce an agreed settlement of a 1988
suit to divide the ex-husband's military retirement benefits. This couple
had married in 1957 while the husband was a member of the Air Force.
They were divorced in 1982 after the decision in McCarty, but it was
agreed that the husband would pay the wife $450 a month from his retirement benefits until her remarriage. The ex-husband complied with the
contract until the wife remarried in 1988. After the ex-wife's new marriage was annulled in 1988, she brought suit to reinstate payments under
the contract. After judgment in favor of the ex-wife, an appeal, and a
remand to the trial court, the dispute was settled and an agreed judgment
was entered in 1992 that the ex-husband pay the ex-wife $385 a month
from his military retirement benefits. Thereafter the ex-husband was employed by another federal agency. When he retired from that employment in 1994 his military retirement entitlement was used to implement
his civil service retirement at a higher rate. Having ceased to receive military retirement payments, the ex-husband ceased making payments under
the 1992 agreed judgment, which the ex-wife then sued to enforce. On
the ex-husband's appeal from a judgment in favor of the ex-wife, the Texarkana Court of Appeals noted that although the ex-wife could have
brought suit for breach of contract under Brannon v. Brannon,360 such a
cause of action was no longer her exclusive remedy after enactment of
section 9.008 in 1987.361 Thus, the court was empowered to implement
the agreed order entered in 1992 to ensure that the ex-husband's unilat362
eral acts did not dispossess the ex-wife of her prior interest.
In Sagester v. Waltrip3 6 3 the court considered whether an unrequivocal
or merely ambiguous repudiation had occurred in relation to military retirement benefits. The couple had been divorced in 1975, but the benefits
were not divided by the court. Two years later, the ex-wife sued for partition of the benefits. The ex-husband, who was then living in another
state, made a special appearance and, subject thereto, responded with a
general denial. In 1981 the ex-wife's suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. In 1997 the ex-wife filed a further suit for partition of the benefits, and the ex-husband again responded with a general denial and
moved for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitation as a
bar to the suit. The trial court accepted the ex-husband's argument that
his general denial in the 1977 suit had constituted an unequivocal repudiation of the ex-wife's interest and granted his motion for summary judgment based on both the general four years and the Family Code's two
358. See id. at 772.
359. 968 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
360. 692 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
361. See McLaurin, 968 S.W.2d at 948 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE
362. See id. at 950.
363. 970 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).

ANN.

§ 9.008).

HUSBAND AND WIFE

1999]

1191

years statute of limitation. 364 The ex-wife appealed. The appellate court
rejected the ex-husband's argument as to the effect of the 1977 general
denial even coupled, as it was, with his failure to share his retirement
benefits over a period of twenty years. The court stressed the general
denial's principal effect of putting all matters at issue before the court and
thus, avoiding any judgment by default. 365 The court acknowledged that
both facts constituted some evidence of repudiation but did not establish
366
unequivocal repudiation.
The effects of the statute of limitation in response to a claim for parti367
tion of retirement benefits was again discussed in Phillips v. Phillips.
The parties' 1990 decree of divorce had failed to divide the proceeds of
community agricultural produce in existence at the time of divorce. The
ex-wife, however, failed to bring suit for equitable division or partition of
the property until almost four years later. The ex-husband asserted that
he had unequivocally repudiated her claim to the proceeds over two years
prior to the assertion of it. The summary judgment proof indicated that
the ex-husband had refused in late 1990 to pay the ex-wife "until his lawyer said he had to."'368 Sometime fairly soon thereafter he wrote her a
check for $2500. The ex-wife related how she had learned he had received more money than previously admitted for the sale of the crops,
and on five different occasions in late 1992 the ex-husband indicated that
he would "get back to her" about the matter. 369 On one of these occasions he had offered her $2000 in final settlement but she refused to accept it. It was not until January, 1993 that he told her he would pay her
nothing, and she could do nothing about it. The ex-wife's suit was filed in
April, 1994. The trial court granted the ex-husband's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the
two-years statute of limitation in Family Code section 9.202(a). 370 The
appellate court held that, in light of the facts of the continued dispute
between the parties, there was a genuine issue of fact as to the time of the
ex-husband's unequivocal repudiation that precluded summary judgment
of the ex-wife's claim to have an equitable division of the undivided property under section 9.202(a). 37 1 The court also concluded that even if her
remedy was barred under section 9.202(a), she could still assert a right to
partition within four years under Property Code section 23.001.372 One
judge dissented on the latter point to express the myopic view that the
364. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Sagester, 970 S.W.2d at 769.
id.
S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
id. at 955.
id. at 957.

See
See
951
See
See

370. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 9.202(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).

§ 9.202(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).

371. See Phillips, 951 S.W.2d at 957.
372. See id. (citing Carter v. Charles, 853 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1993, no writ)); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.001 (West 1998). See also Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 1, 4748 (1988).
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Family Code provides an exclusive remedy for property undivided on
373
divorce.
The Texarkana court found Burchfield v. Finch374 a less difficult case to
resolve, but the resolution of the dispute turned on the burden of proof
which the ex-husband failed to meet. In 1976 the divorce court had
awarded one-half of the husband's community retirement benefits to the
wife, but when the ex-husband retired in 1995, he paid her nothing. She
then brought suit for enforcement of the decree and for an accounting
and partition of the benefits including any increases thereof to which she
was entitled. In making its calculation of the amount awarded to the exwife the trial court evidently computed the benefits due by reference to
their value on retirement, which included some increases since divorce.
Relying on Berry v. Berry,375 the ex-husband asserted on appeal that the
ex-wife was entitled to her share of the value of the benefits at divorce
and nothing more. The appellate court agreed with the appellant's argument based on the authority of Berry but nevertheless sustained the full
award of the trial court. Under the circumstances, the appellate court
said, the only difference between the value of retirement benefits at divorce and the value of those benefits at the date of the ex-husband's retirement was the value of divisible post-divorce increases in value. 376 The
ex-husband's failure to show that the later valuation included any nondivisible benefits therefore required that the trial court's judgment be affirmed. The ex-husband bore the burden of showing the extent of postdivorce increases in the value of the retirement benefits and the value of
non-divisible benefits, if any, because the facts supporting the value and
identity of such benefits were more accessible to him. As the appellate
court pointed out, the same burden of proof had been relied on in Boniface v. Boniface377 and Dessommes v. Dessommes. 378 The court might
379
have added the authority of Berry v. Berry itself.

F.

ENFORCEMENT

In Carter v. Jimerson380 a New Mexican divorce decree filed under the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) in 1983 was
relied on in 1995 to enforce unpaid alimony under that decree under the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. 38 1 Although the ex373. See id. at 958, Vance, J. dissenting in part. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1161, 1193 (1994).
374. 968 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
375. 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983).
376. See Burchfield, 968 S.W.2d at 425.
377. 656 S.W.2d 131, 135 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
378. 505 S.W.2d 673, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
379. See Berry, 647 S.W.2d at 947. See also Moreno v. Alejandro, 775 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied) (As to the award for personal injury suffered during marriage but left undivided on divorce, the court put the burden of showing the community element on the injured spouse.).
380. 974 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.).
381. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.06(b) (Vernon 1998).
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wife who had filed under URESA had complied with its statutory formalities, the Act did not apply to the enforcement of alimony payments in
1983. Hence, for the purpose of the enforcement of the 1995 alimony
payments, the 1983 filing had not been shown to be effective, even as
notice of the alimony claim. 382 Thus, the 1983 filing could not be relied
on for the enforcement of the foreign alimony decree within the ten-years
38 3
statute of limitation.
In McPherren v. McPherren384 the El Paso Court of Appeals was at
pains to point out that a divorce decree specific enough to be enforced by
contempt does not require clarification. The trial court had found that
the decree was specific enough to be enforced by contempt and that finding was supported by sufficient evidence; hence the remedy sought was
385
without foundation.
The extent of a trial court's jurisdiction to punish for violation of an
order of the court of appeals was before the Texas Supreme Court in In re
Gabbai.386 An ex-husband had been ordered by the trial court to execute
certain deeds and assignments pursuant to a divorce decree, and he appealed from that order. The appellate court thereupon ordered the exhusband to file a supersedeas bond or to execute the documents as ordered. The court further provided that if he failed to comply with the
order his appeal would be dismissed. The ex-husband complied with
neither order of the appellate court, and his appeal was thereupon dismissed. The ex-wife then moved the trial court to find the ex-husband in
contempt of its order and that of the court of appeals. The trial court so
found and imposed criminal sanctions for his failure to comply. In releasing the contemnor, the Texas Supreme Court held that the ground for the
order was too extensively stated. 387 Though the trial court might have
punished the relator for violation of its own order, it lacked the power to
punish for violation of the appellate court's order. 388
The nature of the contemnor's punishment was in issue in In re
Ragland.389 The trial court's response to the relator's failure to produce
certain bank records as ordered was to cite her for contempt and assess
imprisonment in the county jail for thirty days. The sentence was suspended, however, and the relator was placed on probation for one year
during which time she was to perform two hundred hours of community
service at the rate of four hours a week. The Tyler Court of Appeals
ordered her release from the ordered requirement of probation. The trial
court had not only failed to specify the proper portion of Rule 215 on
382. See Carter, 974 S.W.2d at 418.
383. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.06(b) (Vernon 1998).
384. 967 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 1998, no pet.).
385. See id. at 490-91.
386. 968 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
387. See id. at 931.
388. See id.
389. 973 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998). Although this problem arose from a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship, it seems equally applicable to a dispute involving
other matters at issue between ex-spouses.
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which the order was based, but the contempt order was not founded on a
39
written order regarding discovery of the documents sought. 0
G.

EFFECTS OF AN Ex-SPOUSE'S POST DIVORCE BANKRUPTCY

In In re Gamble39 1 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against an
ex-husband who sought to use section 523(a)(15) 392 of the Bankruptcy
Code to discharge a debt to his ex-wife. During marriage the husband
(an executive of a bank) and his wife contracted to purchase bank stock
using borrowed money ($116,000) and a $100,000 inheritance of the wife.
In their divorce four years later the court awarded the stock to the husband, ordered him to pay the debt of $116,000 and further ordered him to
sign a note to the wife for $100,000 without interest, payable in three
years. Five years later, the note was still unpaid. The ex-wife then reduced the note to judgment, and the ex-husband promptly filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. To prevent discharge of the note, the ex-wife
asserted that the note fell within the exception of a property settlement
debt under section 523(a)(15). 393 Both the bankruptcy court and the district court found that the debtor had not shown his inability to pay the
note from his disposable income or that the benefit to him of not paying
would outweigh the detriment to his ex-wife under all the circumstances.
The debtor had, in fact, paid another $100,000 unsecured note and discharged a note to his father during the period since their divorce. In its
de novo review of the findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of
law, and after reviewing the record and applying the plain language of the
that the bankruptcy court was not
statute, the appellate court concluded
394
in error in reaching its conclusion.
In Nikoloutsos v. Nikoloutsos 395 an ex-wife fared less well in her appeal
to the federal district court after her ex-husband's Chapter 7 plan had
been converted to a Chapter 13 plan and confirmed by the bankruptcy
court. The ex-husband had filed his initial petition three days after entry
of a Texas court's judgment against him for malicious assault on his exwife, and a conversion to a Chapter 13 proceeding was filed two months
390. See Ragland, 973 S.W.2d at 771-72.
391. 143 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 1998).
392. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).
393. A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... [not in
the nature of alimony or child support as otherwise exempted under § 523(a)(15)] that is
incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation ... unless(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or
property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the
maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent ... ; or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to . . . a former spouse . . . of the
debtor.
Id.
394. See Gamble, 143 F.3d at 225-26 (citing In re Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir.
1997), and authorities from other circuits).
395. 222 B.R. 297 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
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later.396 The district court held that Chapter 13 eligibility requirements
are not jurisdictional and that the ex-wife had waived her objections to
conversion. 397 Further, the ex-wife had failed to carry her burden of persuasion that confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan for partial payment
should have been revoked for the ex-husband's fraud in listing the debt
owed to her as valueless in that he was acting without knowledge of any
misrepresentation and on advice of counsel. 398

396.
625-26
397.
398.

The full facts are set out by the court below. See In re Nikoloutsos, 199 B.R. 624,
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996).
See Nikoloutsos, 222 B.R. at 301.
See id. at 303-05.
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